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Abstract
This article combines survey and national accounts data to estimate non-
cash income from imputed rents, using a consistent methodology for all coun-
tries in order to assemble comparable statistics that allow for a valid inter-
country comparison. We can confirm a significant impact of non-cash income
and find an inequality-decreasing effect for the unconditional income distri-
bution which highly correlates with the proportion of owner-occupiers in the
respective countries. However, aggregated inequality measures are not suited
to analyse the increase of the conditional income inequality between owner-
occupiers and renters, who do not obtain income from imputed rents by def-
inition. Therefore we apply methods from the decomposition literature and
find a strong heterogeneity of tenure structures, tax policies and the resulting
distributional effects on the conditional income distribution.
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1 Introduction
The System of National Accounts (SNA) is designed to depict all produced goods
and services in an economy and hence it includes observed transactions at market
prices, which constitute the main part of it. Additionally, non-monetary income,
expenditure and production items that cannot be observed directly via prices and
market transactions are included. These non-market transactions are quantified by
imputations and their inclusion leads to a less biased picture of economic activity
and enables that the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and its income measures are
brought closer to a sound economic assessment of living standards (Stiglitz et al.,
2009). Furthermore imputations guarantee an enhanced inter-country comparabil-
ity, because the magnitude of economic activities that occur outside the market
sphere can vary widely between individual countries, but there can also be substan-
tial changes over time which can be addressed and quantified by imputations.
One of the largest shares of imputations stems from approximating the services
provided from owner-occupied housing, where rental equivalents are treated as if
home-owners are paying rent to themselves. For countries with a relatively low
share of owner-occupiers like Germany or Austria the gross imputed rents account
for 4.91 % and 5.62 % of the respective total Gross Nation Product (GNP), whereas
the actual rents make up only 3.78 % and 1.88 % (see Table 1). In typical owner-
countries like Italy or Spain the imputed rents account for 8.87 % and 8.98 % and
clearly surpass the share of actual rents which amounts to 1.38 % and 1.77 %.
When we analyse income at the household level the same circumstances apply.
If two households with the same income, dwelling and other characteristics are
compared, except one of them owns the property and the other pays a substantial
part of its income for rent it is plausible to not consider them equally well-off in
terms of their economic situation. Hence, the benefit in form of non-cash income
should be imputed for an comprehensive analysis of household income (Canberra
Group, 2011; OECD, 2013). Imputed rents are also included in the income concepts
in recent literature for creating distributional national accounts (Piketty et al., 2017;
Blanchet et al., 2019; Ederer et al., 2020). As the imputed rents account for a large
part of the total income, a comparative estimation approach is of great importance.
2
Thus, if we include imputations for owner-occupiers in distributional statistics we
can account for different tenure structures and varying ownership rates and conduct
an enhanced comparison over time and between countries.
Since imputed rents represent an income stream, their taxation is also a rele-
vant aspect. In the first half of the 20th century many countries, such as France,
the Scandinavian countries, Belgium, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Spain, and Switzerland taxed imputed rents (Yates, 1994). However, imputed rental
income of owner-occupiers is exempted from tax in most European countries (Figari
et al., 2017; Balcazar et al., 2014; Barrios et al., 2019). The Atkinson-Stiglitz The-
orem (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1976) implies that imputed rents should be taxed and
the underlying assumptions and implications for an optimal tax policy have been
discussed in great detail in the tax literature (Bastani and Waldenstro¨m, 2018; Saez,
2002; Kopczuk, 2013). An inclusion in the personal tax base of income would be
coherent, because it would guarantee a neutral taxation of property (Andrews et al.,
2011; Figari et al., 2012; Pellegrino et al., 2012; Poterba, 1992; Poterba and Sinai,
2008) due to the fact that alternative forms of capital use such as renting or invest-
ments on financial markets are usually taxed as well. Nevertheless, imputed rents
are often indirectly or directly favoured, since purchasing costs of one’s own home,
its renovation or interest payments for mortgages are often tax deductible (Bourassa
et al., 2013; Figari et al., 2019; Juntto and Reijo, 2010). Weather a progressive form
of taxation or a linear is optimal depends on aspects like administrability and redis-
tribution preferences. Aaron (1970); Figari et al. (2017) and Fatica and Prammer
(2018) discuss the tax homeownership bias in European countries and propose that
adding imputed rents to the taxable income reduces inequality and appears to be a
promising tool for lightening taxation of labour without generating inequality in-
creasing side effects, but a progressive form of taxation could also be achieved by
implementing a basic amount which is exempt from taxation in addition to a pro-
portional tax.
This article seeks to shed light on the complexity of distributional effects of non-
cash income from imputed rents and the effects and implications for tax policies in
the realms of property and non-cash income. We realise this by estimating imputed
rents, using a consistent methodology for every single country in order to assemble
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comparable statistics that allow for a valid inter-country comparison. Furthermore,
we apply techniques from the decomposition literature (Fortin et al., 2011) to gain
further insight on the different tenure structure among European countries and the
drivers of inequality.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the data
and first descriptive housing statistics. Section 3 discusses the methods used to esti-
mate non-cash income from imputed rents, as well as the simulation of net incomes
and the decomposition methodology. Section 4 discusses the results including the
effects on the conditional and unconditional distribution of income. In Section 5 the
results of the decomposition exercise are presented and in Section 6 a conclusion of
the findings is provided.
2 Data
We use data from the second (2014) wave of the Household Finance and Consump-
tion Survey (HFCS), conducted by the European System of Central Banks. The
micro-data sets contain comprehensive information on real and financial assets, li-
abilities as well as flows like income and consumption. The data basis allows the
calculation of imputed rents for Owners and Free Users when using the Capital
Market Approach . For Free Users there are no real estate values in the data, there-
fore we impute the values on the basis of the dwelling type (flat, house, etc.) and
living space in terms of square meters1. The data does not allow the calculation
of imputed rents for subsidised tenants, whereby the volume of imputed rents from
subsidised tenancies is multiple times lower compared to the aggregated imputed
rents of owner-occupiers (Fessler et al., 2016).
Table 1 shows the proportions of the tenure types and the average household
size for each country. There are strong structural differences between the various
countries. For instance, South European countries like Spain (ES), Italy (IT) or
Portugal (PT) are characterized by a high proportion of owner-occupiers (89.1 %,
1For Malta no data for square meters is available, hence the real estate value is imputed only by
the average value of the respective dwelling type. For Spain, the Netherlands and Ireland no data for
the dwelling type is available, and therefore only the average value per square meter is used.
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79,3 %, 82.0 %), which comprise of Mortgaged Owner, Outright Owner and Free
User and also an above-average number of household members (2.6, 2.5, 2.6). The
East European countries tend to have similar characteristics, partially with even
higher rates of owner-occupiers and within this group the proportion of owners
with mortgages is substantially lower. On the other hand there are countries like
Germany (DE), Austria (AT) and France (FR) which have a high proportion of
renters (51.1 %, 45.4% , 38.5%) and relatively low numbers of household members
(2.0, 2,1, 2.2). The Netherlands (NL) is the only country where the proportion of
Mortgaged Owner (40.6 %) is bigger than that of Outright Owner (16.9 %). This
is linked to the tax incentive structure in the Netherlands that promotes taking up
additional mortgages for consumption purposes (Frick et al., 2010). Regardless of
the proportion of renters, in all analysed countries the aggregate of the imputed
rents is higher than the actually paid rent. The amount of recurrent property taxes
paid by the household sector varies strongly. For example in Italy no property tax
is paid, in Germany the tax amounts to 0.18 % of GNP, whereas in France the paid
property tax makes up 2.10 % of the GNP.
Throughout the paper, we will analyse Germany and France, which ought to
represent countries with a high proportion of renters, as well as Spain and Italy,
which represent countries with a high proportion of owner-occupiers, in greater
detail.
Figure 1 graphically depicts the proportions of the tenure types along the distri-
bution of gross income for each country. Within the renter-countries the proportion
of renters is higher at the bottom of the income distribution and decreases towards
the upper end. Reversely, the proportion of owner-occupiers increases along the in-
come distribution. In particular the proportion of mortgaged owners rises the most,
since mortgaged owner need to earn a certain income to be eligible for a mortgage
and are therefore more likely to be found at the top half of the distribution. Here
the regressive nature of mortgage tax incentives (Poterba, 1992) comes into evi-
dence. In the owner-countries the proportion of the renters is particularly small in
Spain compared with Italy. Furthermore the proportion of renters along the gross
income is only minimally decreasing and fairly equal distributed compared to Italy,
where renters are more likely to be found at the lower part of the income distribu-
5
Table 1: Housing Statistics
Tenure Type Proportions Aggregates in % of GNP
Free User Mortgaged Owner Outright Owner Renter Household size Imputed Rent Paid Rent Recurrent Property Tax
AT 6.98 15.50 32.16 45.36 2.14 5.62 1.88 0.03
BE 3.05 31.93 38.39 26.63 2.32 6.03 2.61 0.89
CY 17.68 34.26 39.21 8.85 2.76 8.93 1.55
DE 4.51 16.54 27.80 51.15 2.02 4.91 3.78 0.18
EE 12.65 18.67 57.80 10.88 2.25 5.92 0.97
ES 6.00 27.79 55.33 10.88 2.64 8.98 1.77
FI 1.07 32.83 34.86 31.25 2.05 8.28 2.80 0.30
FR 2.80 18.97 39.76 38.46 2.22 7.76 2.39 2.10
GR 6.53 11.42 60.65 21.40 2.52 10.15 2.64
HU 6.46 18.76 65.46 9.32 2.35 6.19 0.51
IE 1.22 33.87 36.62 28.29 2.72
IT 11.08 9.62 58.63 20.68 2.46 8.87 1.38
LU 5.16 29.07 38.53 27.24 2.41 4.72 1.69
LV 7.59 13.47 62.56 16.37 2.38 8.60 0.59 0.10
MT 2.52 15.88 64.32 17.29 2.61 4.19 0.71
NL 0.80 40.56 16.91 41.72 2.18 5.59 2.66 0.42
PL 13.17 12.00 65.41 9.42 2.82 3.14 0.77 0.38
PT 7.29 32.66 42.04 18.00 2.61 7.29 2.09
SI 14.16 8.16 65.56 12.12 2.51 6.33 0.37 0.17
SK 4.38 15.18 70.19 10.24 2.81 8.46 0.84 0.14
Source: HFCS 2014, Eurostat, Proportion in percent
SNA aggregates (2013) refer to the household sector only
Figure 1: Dispersion of tenure types
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Source: HFCS 2014, Tenure status is plotted along the full unconditional gross income distribution
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tion. The ex ante dispersion of the tenure types determines the distributional effect
of imputed rents essentially, as the estimated imputed rents are only assigned to
owner-occupiers.
3 Estimation Strategy
3.1 Estimation of imputed rents
According to the general concept of imputed rents, the use of the property by the
owners is regarded as a service to themselves, whereby this fictitious value can be
estimated by various methods (Balcazar et al., 2014), but should always correspond
to the amount of rent that would have to be paid for a comparable property. The
most commonly used methods from the literature can be subsumed under the fol-
lowing two categories:
The method we use in this paper is the capital market approach. In order to
calculate imputed rents open mortgages are deducted from the current value of the
main residence and the resulting net value of the property is then multiplied by an
exogenous interest rate. The interest rate should correspond to the return of a long-
term investment that is reasonably risk-free and could alternatively be achieved on
the financial market. Besides the uncertainty caused by the choice of the interest
rate that essentially determines the extent of the imputed rents, uncertainty can arise
in survey data due to subjective misjudgements of the real estate value by the owners
(Kiel and Zabel, 1999) or also because of the volatile character of real estate prices
(Garner and Verbrugge, 2009). Therefore, all results should always be analysed
against the background of country-specific institutional circumstances and current
developments of the real estate market. From a recent comparison of subjective
housing price indices based on subjective estimates from the HFCS and traditional
housing price indices (Lepinteur and Waltl, 2020), it becomes evident that owner-
occupiers have an quite accurate perception of general price developments in the
housing market whereas their estimation of the levels tends to be biased and less
suited for measuring property prices. However, the aggregates which we estimate
with this approach show an accurate coverage of the SNA aggregates (see Appendix
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A.3.1).
To apply the rental equivalent approach it is necessary to determine an equiva-
lent for the household main residence in order to estimate the hypothetical rent that
would have to be paid for renting the property on the market. To do so, not the
value of the property is used, but numerous characteristics such as location, condi-
tion, number of rooms, square meters, neighbourhood characteristics and the rental
fee of the equivalents. Based on these variables a hedonic regression model is de-
ployed which is based on the assumption that the rent is additively comprised of the
used property characteristic variables. Problems can arise from the fact that there
may be structural differences between rented and owned properties which are hard
to measure. Furthermore, rental markets are rather small in many countries and
show regional inhomogeneities and hence the price models can react sensitively to
the choice of the estimation method (To¨rma¨lehto and Sauli, 2010).
Prior literature comes to the conclusion that the consideration of imputed rents
has a dampening influence on income inequality (Balcazar et al., 2014). The im-
puted rents themselves are right-skewed and thus unequally distributed, but the
distribution of income tends to be more unequal than the distribution of owner-
occupied homes and the resulting non-cash income from imputed rents. Frick et al.
(2010) come to the conclusion that the dampening effect of the capital market ap-
proach is comparatively lower than that of the rental equivalent approach and that
their empirical findings support the claim for an improved harmonization of the
non-cash component for cross-national comparative research.
We choose the capital market approach for this exercise, because based on the
available data from the HFCS, it allows the methodology to be applied unchanged
to all countries and thus we can conduct a country-comparison, where distortion
due to methodological aspects is reduced to a minimum.
In the second major Europe-wide micro data set, the SILC (Statistics on In-
come and Living Conditions), imputed rents are available for most countries, but
due to different estimation methods in each country they are only partially suited
for comparison (Juntto and Reijo (2010)). Moreover, To¨rma¨lehto and Sauli (2013)
criticise the data quality of the imputed rents in the SILC, because of lacking trans-
parency and state that a conclusive evidence concerning their comparability cannot
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be reached and conclude that for a cross-country comparability the equivalence ap-
proach may not be the optimal choice. Taking theses circumstances into account
we calculate the imputed rents by using the capital market approach as follows:
Every household i is categorized into four groups by tenure status:
ti = 1 for Free Users ti = 2 for Mortgaged Owner
ti = 3 for Outright Owner ti = 4 for Renter
Free Users are households which live in their main residence free of charge.
These are mostly adults who live in a property owned by their parents, although
they run their own household, or parents who have already transferred the property
to their children, but still remain living in this dwelling. For Owners and Free
Users the value of the household main residence (HMR) and the mortgages are
denoted as followed, where for Free Users the latter one is zero by definition. The
maintenance costs are different for every country c ∈ C. The recurrent property
tax reduces imputed rents and can therefore be interpreted as a flat tax on non-cash
income from imputed rents (Zodrow, 2001) in the respective countries. Both can be
found in Table A.4.
Vi = HMR Market value sqmi = HMR size in square meter
Mi = HMR Outstanding mortgage mtcc = Maintenance costs per sqm
ptc = Implicit property tax
Hence the HMR net value V neti is defined by
V neti = Vi −Mi ∀ ti = 1,2,3
For the rare case that the amount of the mortgages exceeds the value of the HMR
V neti is set to zero to avoid negative net values and negative imputed rents respec-
tively. Furthermore we denote an interest rate and the following income concepts
which are used throughout this analysis.
yi = original gross/net disposable income
ynci = net non-cash income from imputed rents
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yti = total gross/net income
r = exogenous interest rate2
Using the capital market approach the imputed rents for Owners and Free Users are
calculated as a return of the HMR net value which depends on the interest rate r.
ynci = V neti × r −mtcc × sqmi − Vi × ptc ∀ ti = 1,2,3
ynci = 0 ∀ ti = 4
yti = yi + ynci
For the case that the maintenance costs and property taxes exceed the non-cash
income stream stemming from the housing net value (V neti × r) the net non-cash
imputed rent3 ynci is set to zero to again avoid negative values.
3.2 Simulation of net incomes
Since non-cash income from imputed rent is rarely taxed, it is especially interesting
to analyse the income effect of adding the rents to the net disposable income, as in-
come from imputed rent expands the consumption possibilities of owner-occupiers
compared to renters who need to use part of their monetary incomes to pay rent.
Therefore the inclusion of imputed rent on the net disposable household income
level should be the principal level of the analysis (Frick et al., 2010). However,
HFCS data does not provide information for the net income or taxes and social
contributions. In order to be able to conduct this kind of analysis we simulate the
taxes and contributions via EUROMOD (Sutherland and Figari, 2013), a tax-benefit
microsimulation model for the European Union. A detailed documentation of the
approach can be found in the Appendix.
2The average 10-year government bond yield for the Euro Area was 2.28 % in 2014 and 2.54
(2014) for the USA. For example Poterba and Sinai (2008) use a rate of 3.5 % in 2008. We assume
a rate of 3 %.
3We abstract from mortgage interest tax relief. Furthermore in the case of Netherlands and
Luxembourg (until 2016) imputed rents are taxed directly. For the sake of comparability we also
abstract from the imputed rent tax for these two countries.
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3.3 Decomposition of inequality measures
After estimating the imputed rents and simulating the net income we calculate in-
equality measures to quantify the distributional effects of the imputed rents. Fur-
thermore we use methods from the decomposition literature to decompose those
measures and gain further insights.
To quantify the inequality within and between renters and owner-occupiers we
use the Theil’s T index, which is a special case of the generalized entropy index
(Haughton and Khandker, 2009), to decompose the origin of the overall inequality
into a within and between component (see Appendix A.2.1).
In order to gain a better understanding of the distributional effects on the uncon-
ditional distribution of income among countries we choose a reweighting procedure
of Fortin et al. (2011) to compute an aggregated decomposition. The reweighting
approach allows to decompose the differences among a set of inequality measures -
which are based on a set of income variables Y = {yi, ynci , yti} and will be denoted
by IM - across countries c ∈ C into a part that is explained by country-specific
housing characteristics and another unobservable part that is not explained by those
characteristics. This allows us to estimate the counterfactual inequality measures
IMCrew, which are based on a comparison of households that have the same housing
characteristics X rather than the original IMC , based on the original distribution of
X . By doing so it is possible to isolate the differences, which occur due to variation
between similar households (according to their housing characteristics) and those
who are caused by the country-specific distribution of X among the households.
The characteristics for which ought to be controlled for are the proportion of the
different tenure groups ti and the household size, which both vary across countries
and seem to have a strong linear relationship with the inequality-reducing effect, as
we can seen in Figure 7.
The international HFCS dataset can be interpreted as an independent and iden-
tically distributed draw from a distribution P containing Y , the set of income vari-
ables which are used for calculating the set IMC . C is a set of dummies indicating
every country c, and X is the set of the chosen housing characteristics. Since the
adequate weighting-design of the HFCS represents such a draw, where the countries
can be seen as a stratification dimension of the survey (Fessler et al., 2014, 2017),
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we can denote PC(Y ∣X) as the conditional distribution of Y given X for country
C = c, and define
PCrew(Y ) = ∫
X
PC(Y ∣X)dP (X). (1)
Equation (1) defines the distribution of Y given X for every subset-population
in country C = c averaged over the full population distribution i.e. over a pooled
sample containing all countries and the respective overall distribution of X . As a
result we compile a counterfactual distribution for each country c ∈ C where all
housing characteristics are identical across countries. Those identical household
characteristics represent the average values of the housing variables i.e. the overall
distribution of X across all included countries. Furthermore we apply the weighted
average property tax rate of all HFCS countries for the reweighted counterfactual
distribution to add the effects from different country-specific tax policies to the
decomposition.
In order to estimate the distribution different decomposition approaches can be
used which were introduced by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and have become
widely used in economics after the application of DiNardo et al. (1995), who ap-
plied these methods to decompose wage structures in labour markets. Later Fortin
et al. (2011) discussed a number of decomposition methods, which are often used
to identify causal effects by applying further assumption. This will not be neces-
sary for the decomposition in this analysis since our aim is only to control for the
systematic variation of housing characteristics across countries. Hence we will be
able to conduct a solid cross-country comparison where the remaining differences
between similar households can be identified. The remaining variation will mainly
stem from the dispersion of tenure types along the income distribution and their
respective income, as we control for the proportion of X and the property tax rate
in each country.
Since equation (1) cannot be observed directly it has to be rewritten as follows
in order to obtain the counterfactual distribution
PCrew(Y ) = ∫
X
PC(Y ∣X)dP (X)
= ∫
X
PC(Y ∣X)ΨCdPC(X) = PCrew(Y ). (2)
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The reweighting factor ΨC is required for every country c and can be denoted by
rewriting
dP (X) = PC(X)ΨC(X)
ΨC(X) = P (X)
PC(X) = 1(C = c)P (C = c ∣X) (3)
where 1(...) denotes the indicator function from the country-dummiesC and P (C =
c ∣ X) is the probability for a household being from country c given its housing
characteristics X . The latter one can be estimated by a logit regression for every
country c:
Pˆ (C = c ∣X) = eX ⋅βC
1 + eX ⋅βC (4)
After we estimate this term we can reweight the data by ΨC and hence we can
calculate the different (counterfactual) inequality measures
IM corresponding to the initial net disposable income yi,
IM t corresponding to the total net disposable income yti ,
IMrew corresponding to yi of the reweighted counterfactual,
IM trew corresponding to yti of the reweighted counterfactual,
for each country c ∈ C. We decompose the measures into the following parts, by
simply expanding the formulae with the estimated inequality measures in two steps
and rearranging the parenthesis
IM t − IM = IM t − IMrew + IMrew − IM= IM t − IM trew + IM trew − IMrew + IMrew − IM= (IM t − IM trew)´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
∆XT
+ (IM trew − IMrew)´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
∆T
+ (IMrew − IM)´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
∆X
. (5)
The Term ∆X captures the decomposition effect that stems from reweighting
on the basis of the household characteristics and the property tax rate. It represents
the change of the inequality measures which occurs due to a change of household
incomes which accompanies controlling for the household housing characteristics
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and the property tax rate. If, for example, a country has an above average proportion
of renters, who have a lower income on average, the reweighting pushes this pro-
portion down to the average of all countries. Accordingly, the decomposition effect
will be negative, i.e. it will reduce the inequality. If a country has an above average
property tax rate, the applied average tax rate in the counterfactual will result in an
amplification of the distributional effects of the imputed rents and vice versa.
∆T will be called treatment effect and reflects the change in inequality measures
which results from adding the imputed rents to the net income. Hence, the magni-
tude of this effect will mainly be driven by the dispersion of the imputed rents along
the net income distribution. The inequality-decreasing effect will be bigger when
the tenure groups are evenly distributed along the income distribution, as this is a
necessary condition for an even distribution of the imputed rents themselves.
If owner-occupiers with very high imputed rents would only be found at the
top of the distribution, the inequality-reducing effect could be very small or even
reversed. The same distributional effects apply for the dispersion of the household
groups according to their household size. Hence, this effect can be partly inter-
preted as a measurement of the segregation regarding to the dispersion of housing
characteristics along the income distribution. However, the magnitude is also ef-
fected by the relative size of non-cash income from imputed rents in proportion to
the net income level.
∆XT will be referred to as the decomposition treatment effect, as this step
reflects the reverse operation of ∆X , but also includes an additional component,
namely correcting for the part of ∆T that occurred due to the changed housing
characteristics and property tax rate levels, i.e. the initial decomposition step ∆X .
Therefore it is expected that this effect will have the opposite direction of ∆X , but
if, however, the part of ∆T that occurred due to the changed housing characteristics
is big enough, the signs of ∆XT and ∆X could both be positive or negative.
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Hence Equation (5) can be rewritten
IM t − IM = IM t − IM trew + IM trew − IMrew + IMrew − IM= (IM t − IM trew + IMrew − IM)´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
∆TX
+ (IM trew − IMrew)´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
∆T
(6)
where ∆TX will be called treatment decomposition effect, as this is now the
part of the change in inequality measures that is induced due to country-specific
household characteristics X . This allows us to decompose the change of the Gini
index, which stems from adding the non-cash income from imputed rents into two
parts. The treatment effect ∆T , which is not explained by the country-specific
proportion of the housing characteristics X and the property tax rate, as well as
the treatment decomposition effect ∆TX , which represents the ’explained’ part that
occurs due to the country specific housing and tax characteristics.
As for any decomposition method a lack of common support constitutes a prob-
lem and would lead to poor reweighting estimators in the case of the reweighting
procedure. Figure A.2 in the Appendix shows that the common support is given for
our decomposition.
4 Distributional Effects of Imputed Rents
4.1 Estimated rents
Table 2 shows the average and median income and estimated imputed rents, the
percentage change for the average values in terms of the original observed income
as well as the average household members younger than 16 years and the household
members in employment for all tenure groups for Germany. The equivalent tables
for all other countries can be found in the Data Appendix.
Mortgaged Owner have the highest gross and net income, followed by Outright
Owner which is, as already pointed out previously, linked to the minimum income
needed for being eligible for a loan. In general owner-occupiers have the highest
number of household members older than 16 years, but when it comes to house-
hold members in employment the Mortgaged Owner households are far ahead with
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an average of 1.6 compared to Outright Owner (0.8), Renter (0.9) and Free User
(0.6). The highest average annual non-cash income from imputed rent is found for
Outright Owner (6,100 e), followed by Free User (4,900 e) and Mortgaged Owner
(3,900 e). Mortgaged Owner tend to have the highest gross imputed rents, but
they still have to pay instalments for their mortgages, which reduces the final net
non-cash income.
Renters obtain no income from imputed rents by definition. Thus, this leads
to an increased conditional income inequality among tenure groups, as renters will
always find them self worse off in terms of their total household income, compared
to owner-occupiers. The average imputed rents make up 16.4 % for Free User, 10.8
% for Outright Owner and 5.0 % for Mortgaged Owner in terms of their original
average gross income. For all households this proportion amounts to 5.3 %, due
to the fact that Renters gain no additional income. In terms of the average original
net income the proportions are consistently higher, with 21.3 % for Free User, 15.0
% for Outright Owner and 7.1 % for Mortgaged Owner. The overall proportion
makes up 7.2 %, which is higher than in other renter-countries like France (5.13
%). Within the owner-countries the overall gains from imputed rents in terms of
their original net income are higher, with 14.13 % for Spain and 18.14 % for Italy.
Thus, it becomes clear that the relative importance varies between the countries and
is especially high in the owner-countries.
Figure 2 shows the average imputed rent for each percentile along the gross
income distribution for all households and owner-occupiers for Germany. On the
left-hand side in absolute terms and on the right-hand side as a percentage of the
gross income. The estimates show a clear pattern, but nevertheless the fluctuation
between each percentile appears to be rather random than valuable information and
hence we applied different smoothing techniques to obtain more robust results4. As
we smooth the imputed rents for all owner-occupiers each household in the respec-
tive percentile gets assigned the same non-cash income from imputed rent. This
guarantees more robust results, but however it also effects the analysis in Section
4For further analysis along the unconditional income distribution we used the smoothed imputed
rents for owner-occupiers to obtain more robust results. Nevertheless, the results did not deviate
noticeably from the unsmoothed version.
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Table 2: DE - Gross and net income in 1.000 e
Gross income
Observed income (yi) + Non-cash income (ynci ) = Total income (yti) Diff. ∅ values Household members
mean median mean median mean median change in % above 16y in employment
Free User 29.8 22.1 4.9 4.5 34.7 29.0 16.4 1.5 0.6
Mortgaged Owner 77.0 60.7 3.9 2.3 80.8 63.6 5.0 2.1 1.6
Outright Owner 56.6 41 6.1 4.2 62.7 44.8 10.8 1.8 0.8
Renter 36.3 28.1 0 0 36.3 28.1 0 1.5 0.9
Total 48.4 35.5 2.6 0 51.0 37.7 5.3 1.7 1.0
Net income
Observed income (yi) + Non-cash income (ynci ) = Total income (yti) Diff. ∅ values Household members
mean median mean median mean median change in % above 16y in employment
Free User 23.0 19.3 4.9 4.5 27.9 24.7 21.3 1.5 0.6
Mortgaged Owner 54.3 43.9 3.9 2.3 58.2 47.0 7.1 2.1 1.6
Outright Owner 40.7 30.9 6.1 4.2 46.9 35.7 15.0 1.8 0.8
Renter 27.5 22.5 0 0 27.5 22.5 0 1.5 0.9
Total 35.4 27.1 2.6 0 38.0 29.5 7.2 1.7 1.0
Source: HFCS 2014, net income from EUROMOD simulations. Change in % refers to the
percentage change for the average values in terms of the original observed income.
4.3, as the inequality between all tenure groups is reduced to the inequality between
renters and owner-occupiers.
Local linear regressions, kernel regression estimates as well as smoothing splines
show similar results for the German case. Owner-occupiers at the bottom 60 per-
centiles of the gross income distribution have an annual average income from im-
puted rents of approximately 4,500 e. The moderately increasing trajectory lasts
until the 90. percentile (7,000 e), where the slope steepens substantially until the
average imputed rent surpasses values of 8,500 e for households in the Top 5%.
This picture indicates that for owner-occupier the likelihood of living in a dwelling
with greater quality and/or size, which consequently results in higher imputed rents,
rises with increasing income. For all households this curve has an slightly steeper
slope, which results from the fact that renters have a higher probability of being
found at a lower part of the income distribution. Although this further indicates a
right-skewed i.e. an unequal distribution of imputed rents, the distribution of the
gross income itself is distributed more unequally and hence the slope of the im-
puted rents as a proportion of the gross income is declining for owner-occupiers,
but also for all households. We can also see that non-cash income from imputed
rents make up a substantial part of the gross income for households at the bottom
of the distribution.
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Figure 2: Germany - Dispersion of imputed rents along the income distribution
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Source: HFCS 2014, Average non-cash income from imputed rents are plotted for owner-occupiers
only and all tenure types along the full unconditional income distribution
In Figure 3 we show the smoothed imputed rents for all tenure types along the
unconditional gross income distribution for all countries. Again the various smooth-
Table 3: Implicit taxation of non-cash income from imputed rent from recurrent
property tax
AT BE CY DE EE ES FI FR GR HU IE IT LU LV MT NL PL PT SI SK
Rate (in %) 1.1 26.6 6.7 5.3 0.0 9.2 9.6 54.7 4.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 0.0 0.0 15.0 46.3 11.6 4.5 5.5
Source: Own calculation, HFCS 2014, Housing Taxation Database (European Commission)
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Figure 3: Effect on the unconditional gross income distribution for all countries
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Source: HFCS 2014, Average non-cash income from imputed rents are plotted for all tenure types
along the full unconditional income distribution
ing approaches deliver similar results, but since the kernel regression estimates and
smoothing splines perform poorly with outliers and at the boundaries, we choose
the local linear regression smoothing for the further analysis. Starting on the left
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Figure 4: Dispersion of private market rents and imputed rents along the
unconditional gross income distribution
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Source: HFCS 2014, Rents are plotted for owner-occupiers (Imputed rent) and renters (Market rent)
along the unconditional gross income distribution and smoothed (Local Linear Regressions)
side of Figure 3, we see the absolute values of the imputed rents. The average im-
puted rents rise with increasing gross income for all countries. Nonetheless, the
degree of the slope varies among countries. Compared to Germany, the curve for
Spain starts at a higher point at the bottom of the distribution, which is certainly
linked to a higher relative proportion of owner-occupiers at this part of the income
distribution. However, the increase is not as strong so that the curves cross towards
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the upper part of the distribution5.
The imputed rents in terms of the disposable gross income vary even stronger. In
Spain, which represents other owner-countries, the proportion of owner-occupiers
is relatively high along the whole income distribution, while the income level is
somewhat lower compared to Germany. Hence, the non-cash income from imputed
rents especially plays a crucial role for lower income households, which is displayed
by the higher dispersion of the curves at the bottom of the distribution.
Rental and housing markets are strongly shaped by path-dependent develop-
ments within each country, resulting from governmental institutions and national
regulation (Balchin, 2013; Mora, 2010) and therefore the characteristics of those
markets vary widely between European countries. This heterogeneity also comes
in evidence when we look at Figure 4, where we display both imputed and actual
paid rents along the gross income distribution.
Austria and Poland have been added to the renter- and owner-countries, respec-
tively to display the variety. In Germany the imputed and market rents have a very
similar trajectory and the implicit recurrent property tax of 0.13 % (see Table A.4)
has no substantial effect and corresponds to a imputed rent tax rate of 5.3 % (see
Table 3). In France the trajectories of the rents are similar, however, the level of the
imputed rents is significantly lower. This is linked to the highest effective recurrent
property tax rate (1.25 %) of all countries, which leads to an implicit taxation of
the non-cash income of 54.7 %. Since high property taxes tend to raise the level of
market rents (Tsoodle and Turner, 2008) we may underestimate the imputed rents
in some countries as we apply the same exogenous interest rate without correct-
ing for this nexus. However, also segregation between renters and owner-occupiers
(Juntto and Reijo, 2010) can be a possible explanation. If, for instance, renters are
more likely to live in metropolitan areas, where prices and rents tend to be higher,
the level of the rents will also differ. This is especially the case in France with Paris
having the highest rental prices of all European cities (UBS, 2018). In Austria the
estimated imputed rents are higher than the actual rents with a low effective prop-
5The country with the significantly higher level of imputed rents is Luxembourg. However, the
income level is also rather high and hence this equals out, as can be seen on the right-hand side of
Figure 3.
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erty tax of 0.03 %, which is equivalent to an 1.1 % imputed rent tax rate. Whereas
the slope along the income distribution is especially steep for the top income house-
holds6 actual rents only increase slightly along the whole distribution. The reverse
picture between this two renter-countries is most probably linked to the strong reg-
ulated renting market and relatively high proportion of social housing in Austria
(Kunnert and Baumgartner, 2012), with the result that Austrian rents are among
the lowest third in the Euro Area (Fessler et al., 2014). The owner-countries show a
more homogeneous picture of the renting segments, especially in Italy and Spain. In
Poland, both levels are comparably low. Only the actual paid market rents increase
steeper towards higher income groups. In Italy and Spain the implicit imputed rent
tax rate is 0.0 % and 9.2 % respectively, whereas in Poland the rate (46,3 %) is the
second highest of the analysed countries.
4.2 Effects on the unconditional distribution of the net income
From a theoretical perspective, adding the imputed rents to the net income could
both increase or decrease the income inequality. As discussed in Section 4.1 the
literature almost exclusively finds decreasing effects, which also holds true for this
exercise, as can be seen in Table 4. However, the degree of the inequality-decreasing
effect varies strongly among the countries.
In France and Austria, where the Gini of the net disposable income is com-
paratively low (0.34, 0.31), the inequality decreasing effect of adding the non-cash
income from imputed rents is rather small. The Gini does not change for both
countries. In France only the P90/P10 decrease minimally, whereas in Austria the
P90/P50 and P90/P10 decrease somewhat. Among other renter-countries like Ger-
many (0.43) or the Netherlands (0.32) the Gini decreases by 0.01 in each country.
For the owner-countries the inequality-decreasing effect is consistently larger as for
Spain (0.41), Italy (0.37) and Poland (0.39) the Gini decreases by 0.03, 0.02 and
0.02.
6Survey data reveal difficulties in correctly capturing the wealthiest households due to selection
probabilities, non-response and other methodological barriers. It can therefore be assumed that the
shown rents at the top underestimate the actual values (Alvaredo et al., 2013; Vermeulen, 2018;
Angel et al., 2019)
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Table 4: Counterfactual inequality measures
Observed net income (yi) + Non-cash income (ynci ) = Total net income (yti) Total net income (no prop. tax)
Gini P90/P50 P90/P10 Gini P90/P50 P90/P10 Gini P90/P50 P90/P10 Gini P90/P50 P90/P10
AT 0.31 1.98 4.12 0.52 1.56 Inf 0.31 1.93 4.05 0.31 1.93 4.05
BE 0.34 2.08 4.38 0.31 1.14 Inf 0.32 1.99 4.32 0.32 1.97 4.38
CY 0.40 2.41 7.87 0.20 1.43 2.21 0.37 2.31 5.73 0.36 2.30 5.65
DE 0.41 2.37 6.78 0.59 Inf Inf 0.40 2.38 6.86 0.40 2.39 6.87
EE 0.49 3.18 9.54 0.26 1.65 Inf 0.46 2.99 7.82
ES 0.41 2.28 6.29 0.23 1.57 Inf 0.38 2.22 5.14 0.38 2.21 5.05
FI 0.35 2.15 5.20 0.39 1.47 Inf 0.34 2.13 5.06 0.34 2.13 5.08
FR 0.34 2.04 4.52 0.47 1.63 Inf 0.34 2.03 4.49 0.34 2.04 4.50
GR 0.34 2.12 5.07 0.29 1.35 Inf 0.32 2.04 4.51 0.32 2.04 4.49
HU 0.40 2.40 5.73 0.21 1.48 1.83 0.37 2.27 4.90
IE 0.38 2.31 6.10 0.34 1.31 Inf 0.36 2.26 5.35
IT 0.37 2.38 5.86 0.32 1.53 Inf 0.35 2.27 5.16
LU 0.37 2.21 5.65 0.36 1.53 Inf 0.35 2.14 5.42 0.35 2.14 5.42
LV 0.51 3.33 8.85 0.36 2.03 Inf 0.50 3.25 8.22
MT 0.39 2.26 6.23 0.22 1.19 Inf 0.34 2.07 4.75
NL 0.32 1.96 4.73 0.43 1.13 Inf 0.31 1.94 4.46 0.31 1.93 4.45
PL 0.39 2.32 6.64 0.19 1.18 1.57 0.37 2.24 5.81 0.36 2.17 5.36
PT 0.38 2.34 5.99 0.27 1.36 Inf 0.36 2.24 5.25 0.36 2.24 5.20
SI 0.40 2.36 7.15 0.21 1.27 Inf 0.36 2.20 5.73 0.36 2.20 5.73
SK 0.38 2.08 6.13 0.20 1.27 Inf 0.35 2.02 5.34 0.35 2.02 5.30
Source: HFCS 2014, net income from EUROMOD simulations
On the right side of Table 4 we display the total net income without deducting
the recurrent property tax from the imputed rent. Although the rate is the highest
in France there is no significant change, as the the property tax operates as a flat
tax and therefore it only amplifies or mitigates the original distributional effect of
the non-cash income. For Poland, the inequality decreasing effect would be larger
without a tax and lead to a decrease of the Gini index by one additional point.
The caveats of an exclusion of imputed rents from taxation, as already discussed
in the introduction, distorts the taxation of real income and discriminates renters
(Goode, 1960). The efficiency of the implicit proportional taxation of imputed rents
by property taxes is not clear. However, since rental income from landlords is part
of the income tax base in most countries a proportional tax does not constitute a full
integration in the income tax system which is characterized by progressive taxes due
to efficiency considerations (Corneo, 2002) and policy preferences (Roemer, 1999).
Also the high concentration of real estate wealth in the upper part of the income
distribution and the aggravated possibilities for tax evasion for immovable property
(Alstadsæter et al., 2019) could motivate a progressive taxation. Analogous to prop-
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erty taxes, which are often promoted by economists because of efficiency reasons,
the general public may be less positive towards a substantial taxation of imputed
rents (Bastani and Waldenstro¨m, 2018).
4.3 Effects on the conditional distribution of net income
The main lesson from the previous Subsection is that imputed rents reduce the un-
conditional inequality in most countries, in typical owner-countries more and in
countries with a higher proportion of renters less. However, the aggregated distri-
butional measures of inequality do not capture the complex distributional effects
of imputed rents, as income from imputed rent is not distributed equally over all
households. Wealth fulfills different functions and only certain groups can generate
income from assets (Fessler and Schu¨rz, 2018). Hence by definition, renters fall be-
hind compared to owner-occupiers along the income distribution, since only owner-
occupiers obtain imputed non-cash income from their housing wealth. Therefore
we decompose the contradictory distributional effects of the overall inequality in
this Subsection. As previously mentioned we use the smoothed imputed rent of all
owner-occupier for Mortgaged Owner, Outright Owner and Free User as the differ-
ences between those groups are mostly linked to housing consumption over the life
cycle (Banks et al., 2004) and we want to focus on capturing the income differences
between owners and renters.
The blue shaded areas in Figure 5 represent the shares of the different tenure
types along the distribution of the total net disposable income, i.e. after adding
the imputed rents to the net income. The dotted line represents the share of the
renters along the original net disposable income, i.e. before taking imputed rents
into account.
The proportion of renters in the lower part of the net income distribution is
higher after adding the imputed rents, compared to the original net disposable in-
come scenario in all countries. In Germany, the proportion of renters in the lower
income groups by net income is already very high before imputed rents are added
and amounts to 70 % in the bottom-50 , but this share increases due to the income
flow from imputed rents and amounts up to 78 %. In Spain and Italy, the initial
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Figure 5: Tenure status along the distribution of total net income
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Source: HFCS 2014, Tenure status is plotted along the full unconditional total net income distribu-
tion for the coloured areas. The dashed line represents the share of renters along the full uncondi-
tional original net income distribution (before taking imputed rents into account)
proportion of renters in the bottom-50 is lower (15 %, 31 %) and increases to 20 %
and 45 %.
Thus, we can state that the inequality at the lower end of the distribution tends
to increase, whereas it decreases towards the upper end, since owner-occupiers are
overrepresented towards the top and all of them receive non-cash income from im-
puted rents and are therefore affected by the inequality-reducing effect.
Table 5 shows the results from the Theil index decomposition. The results for
the total Theil’s T index show the same pattern as for the Gini indices. The initial
value for the renter-countries Germany (0.31), France (0.21), Austria (0.16) and
Netherlands (0.16) only declines by 0.01 for Germany and stays the same for the
remaining renter-countries. For the owner-countries the decline after adding the
imputed rents are again consistently higher. However, we want to direct the focus
of the analysis towards the composition of the index. For the initial net dispos-
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Table 5: Theil index
Observed net income (yi) Total net income (yti)
Theil Within groups Between groups Theil Within groups Between groups
AT 0.16 87.30 12.70 0.16 77.03 22.97
BE 0.20 83.91 16.09 0.18 78.30 21.70
CY 0.27 92.88 7.12 0.23 91.56 8.44
DE 0.31 87.05 12.95 0.30 82.31 17.69
EE 0.42 82.96 17.04 0.37 82.53 17.47
ES 0.31 96.76 3.24 0.27 95.29 4.71
FI 0.20 79.14 20.86 0.20 74.64 25.36
FR 0.21 87.53 12.47 0.21 83.63 16.37
GR 0.18 96.93 3.07 0.18 95.16 4.84
HU 0.28 97.23 2.77 0.25 96.73 3.27
IE 0.25 88.13 11.87 0.23 85.30 14.70
IT 0.23 88.80 11.20 0.21 83.03 16.97
LU 0.25 91.13 8.87 0.22 83.78 16.22
LV 0.56 85.23 14.77 0.53 84.98 15.02
MT 0.26 94.18 5.82 0.21 88.04 11.96
NL 0.16 86.22 13.78 0.16 79.44 20.56
PL 0.26 92.88 7.12 0.24 92.23 7.77
PT 0.26 89.58 10.42 0.24 86.92 13.08
SI 0.26 94.39 5.61 0.22 91.76 8.24
SK 0.26 96.43 3.57 0.23 95.30 4.70
Source: HFCS 2014, Net income from EUROMOD simulations
The Within groups and Between groups are given as percentage shares of the overall inequality
able income the share of the between-groups inequality is already higher for renter-
countries. In Germany the share is at 13 % and increases to 18 % after adding the
imputed rents, whereas for Spain, the initial level is set at 3 % and only rises to 5%.
To gain a better understanding of the pattern we plot the proportion of renters
against the ex ante and ex post level of the between-groups inequality proportion
in Figure 6. The beginning of each arrow represents the level of between-groups
inequality for the initially observed net disposable income, whereas the arrow head
indicates the level of between-groups inequality for the total net disposable income.
The linear correlation for the initially observed net disposable income, represented
by the continuous line, with a significant (CI: 95 %) Pearson Correlation Coef-
ficient (PCC) of 0.52 displays the positive relationship between renter proportion
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Figure 6: Theil-index - Inequality between tenure groups
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Source: HFCS 2014, The beginning of the arrow represents the level of between-groups inequal-
ity for the initially observed net disposable income, whereas the arrow head indicates the level of
between-groups inequality for the total net disposable income (after adding the non-cash income
from imputed rents). The linear correlation for the initially observed net disposable income is
represented by the continuous line. The linear correlation for the total net disposable income is
represented by the dotted line
and between-groups inequality. The dotted line represents the linear correlation of
the between-group inequality and the total net disposable income. The linear re-
lationship magnifies and is indicated by a highly significant PCC of 0.71. This is
also visualised by the length of the arrows, which is comparably small for most
owner-countries and increases structurally for countries with a higher proportion of
renters. However, for example, the absolute change is smaller for Germany than for
Austria, since not only the proportion of renters is defining the change, but also the
position of the renters along the income distribution. For countries where this distri-
bution is comparably equal, the between-group inequality does not increase much.
This is especially the case for most Eastern European countries, Spain, Greece and
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Portugal, but also for France and Germany. On the other hand, countries where
the decline of the proportion of renters along the income distribution is steeper, the
between-group inequality rises disproportionately high in respect to their overall
proportion of renters. This is the case for Malta, Italy, Luxembourg and Austria.
The dispersion of tenure types for all countries can be found in Figure B.2 in the
Data Appendix.
Overall, the dampening effect on the inequality in terms of the unconditional
distribution of net income is lower for renter-countries. Furthermore, the composi-
tion change of inequality is stronger in renter-countries, as more renters fall behind
in the distribution, since they do not obtain any income from imputed rent. How-
ever, the remaining variance is linked to the dispersion of renters along the income
distribution and not only determined by the overall proportion of renters. As this
social segregation in terms of the household income plays a crucial role for the
distributional effects of imputed rents and their taxation.
5 Decomposition of Distributional Effects -What drives
the difference?
When conducting country-comparison we should always consider country-specific
institutional circumstances in our interpretation. In the renter-countries Germany,
France, and Austria the rental market is thoroughly regulated. In Spain a poten-
tial increase of rents is linked to the consumer price index, whereas in Italy there
is no specific regulation of rent increases since 1998 (Mora, 2010). However, the
institutional characteristics are manifold and often strongly linked to national law
and other qualitative factors which are hard to grasp quantitatively. Nevertheless,
it already became apparent that the segmentation of the different tenure groups is
a crucial factor for the influence of non-cash income from imputed rents. There-
fore, we further investigate this relationship in order to decompose the hitherto
analysed distributional effects into a part which is explained by country-specific
housing characteristics together with the recurrent property tax and a remaining
part.
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Figure 7: Country groups
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Source: HFCS 2014, in percent
The dashed line is the respective unweighted mean for the avg. equalizing effect and the avg.
proportion of renters
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Figure 8: Country groups reweighted - Tenure status
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In Figure 7 the linear relationship of the inequality-reducing effect in terms
of the relative Gini index change and the proportion of renters (a) as well as the
correlation with the average household size (b) are displayed. We also group the
countries by the unweighed averages of the renter proportion and the inequality
reducing effect in part (a). The dashed line indicates the unweighted average of
these characteristics. Countries that have a below average proportion of owners
and a below average reduction of the Gini index are called ’Renter’ and countries
that have an above average proportion of owners and an above average Gini index
change are called ’Owner’.
We see that almost all the East European countries like Slovakia, Slovenia, Hun-
gary, Estonia and Poland are assembled in the ’Owner-group’. Latvia and Poland
are not in one of the two groups as the reduction of inequality is comparable low
in those countries. Also all South European countries fall into this group. The
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group of ’Renter’ consists of Belgium, Ireland, Finland, France, the Netherlands,
Austria and Germany. Overall the linear relationship is very strong (PCC: 0.81)
and highly significant (CI: 95 %). The negative linear relationship of the average
household size and the Gini index change is also clearly evident (PCC: -0.71) and
highly significant. Therefore these two household characteristics are chosen to be
controlled for to capture the country-specific background of the housing market and
decompose the distributional effects7.
In Figure 8 we present the inequality-reducing effect of the imputed rents after
reweighting, which is ∆T as a percentage of the reweighted Gini index (IMrew).
The reweighting brings the proportions of the tenure groups approximately in line,
which becomes apparent as all countries now show a proportion of renters of about
30-31 %8. The same holds true for the household size, as can be seen in Figure A.3.
The variance of the inequality-reducing effect is now lower, as the remaining effect
represents the isolated treatment effect ∆T , which increases for renter-countries
and decreases for owner-countries. Germany and France, for example, have now a
higher decrease of the Gini index, since the reweighting decreases the proportion of
renters to the average level and therefore more households obtain non-cash income
from imputed rents in the reweighted scenario. For the renter-countries Spain and
Italy it is vice versa.
Table 6 finally presents the whole spectrum of the decomposition in detail. The
decomposed origin of the inequality-reducing effect ∆Gini is shown in the right
section of the table, where the treatment effect ∆T and the treatment decompo-
sition effect ∆TX are defined as a normed proportion of the entire absolute Gini
index change. A negative sign in the column ∆TX indicates a inequality decreas-
ing effect of the country-specific housing characteristics. The interpretation can be
conducted as follows. For Germany the absolute Gini decreases by 0.004, which
constitutes a relative reduction of 1.02 %. The overall change is comparatively
small, but the change is driven by opposed factors and accordingly comprises of an
inequality-decreasing treatment effect (-2.15 %) which accounts for 62.5 % of the
7For the tenure status the four groups Renter, Outright Owner, Mortgaged Owner and Free User
are used. For the household size 6 groups are built, reaching from 1 to 6+ household members.
8Note that the proportion is not exactly on point as we use a semiparametric approach and
rebalance various categorical variables.
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Table 6: Net income Gini index decomposition
∆Gini absolute
In % of Gini index Origin of ∆Gini
∆Gini ∆XT ∆X ∆T ∆TX ∆T ∆TX
AT -0.000 -0.08 2.72 -0.65 -2.15 2.07 −50.9 49.1
BE -0.013 -4.00 -2.47 2.50 -4.02 0.03 −99.3 0.7
CY -0.038 -9.36 -3.28 0.00 -6.09 -3.27 −65.0 −35.0
DE -0.004 -1.02 2.49 -0.95 -2.55 1.53 −62.5 37.5
EE -0.031 -6.32 -1.01 -1.79 -3.52 -2.81 −55.6 −44.4
ES -0.032 -7.79 -6.03 4.21 -5.97 -1.82 −76.7 −23.3
FI -0.005 -1.50 1.58 -1.26 -1.82 0.32 −85.0 15.0
FR -0.002 -0.70 1.50 -0.14 -2.06 1.36 −60.3 39.7
GR -0.019 -5.44 -2.28 1.09 -4.25 -1.19 −78.1 −21.9
HU -0.025 -6.42 -0.43 -2.24 -3.74 -2.68 −58.3 −41.7
IE -0.014 -3.75 -2.95 3.59 -4.39 0.64 −87.3 12.7
IT -0.022 -6.00 -2.45 -0.43 -3.12 -2.88 −52.0 −48.0
LU -0.019 -5.06 -1.13 0.60 -4.53 -0.53 −89.5 −10.5
LV -0.014 -2.66 -6.03 5.01 -1.64 -1.02 −61.6 −38.4
MT -0.042 -10.99 -7.58 3.67 -7.08 -3.91 −64.4 −35.6
NL -0.007 -2.06 0.57 1.82 -4.45 2.39 65.1 34.9
PL -0.018 -4.61 -4.29 3.69 -4.01 -0.6 −86.9 −13.1
PT -0.021 -5.49 -5.03 4.40 -4.86 -0.60 −88.5 −11.5
SI -0.038 -9.48 -4.63 0.41 -5.26 -4.22 −55.5 −44.5
SK -0.023 -6.03 0.56 -2.56 -4.03 −2.00 −66.9 −33.1
Source: HFCS 2014, net income from EUROMOD simulations
All columns in the mid section are shown as a percentage change of the original observed net
income Gini (IM ).
The right section origin of∆Gini represents the normed proportion of the entire Gini change. A
negative sign in the column∆TX indicates a inequality decreasing effect of this component.
Hence, the sum of the absolute values equals up to 100.
absolute total Gini index change and an inequality-increasing treatment decomposi-
tion effect (+1.53 %) which accounts for 37.5 % of the absolute Gini index change.
For France we find a similar pattern for the contradictory relationship with a treat-
ment effect proportion of 60.3 %. In Austria the two effects cancel out such that the
Gini reduction amounts to only 0.08 %. This indicates that in Austria the segrega-
tion of household types along the net income distribution, according to the housing
characteristics X (tenure type and household size), is relatively strong, compared
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to countries like Germany and France.
For owner-countries like Spain, Italy and Poland the overall reduction is driven
by two inequality-decreasing components, albeit the relationship varies strongly. In
Spain the household housing characteristics and taxation are responsible for only
23.3 %, whereas in Italy this component accounts for 48.0 % of the overall reduc-
tion. This indicates a lower degree of segregation in Spain in terms of the housing
characteristics, as the inequality-reducing treatment effect ∆T in % of the original
Gini index (-5.97 %) is one of the highest. One aspect of this can be seen in Fig-
ure 5 when we look at the dispersion of renters along the net income distribution.
In Spain, the renters are distributed relatively even along the net income distribu-
tion, whereas in Italy, most renters are found at the lower part of the distribution,
and therefore the equalizing treatment effect is comparatively lower. Furthermore,
there is no recurrent property tax in Italy which additionally increases the propor-
tion of the treatment effect. In Poland, where the recurrent property tax is above
average and therefore it mitigates the inequality decreasing effect (see Table 4), the
treatment effect accounts for 13.1 % of the Gini reduction.
6 Conclusion
In this article, we have estimated imputed rents in order to gain a broader and more
comprehensive picture of the income structure in European countries. Therefore,
we deploy micro data from the HFCS to estimate non-cash income from imputed
rents for the participating countries. The data set provides extensive information
on housing and household gross income, but, additionally we employ data from
the SILC to simulate tax ratios and further estimate the household net income in
the HFCS. Since imputed rents are rarely taxed the distributional effects on the net
income level are of special interest, as the non-cash income from imputed rents di-
rectly expands the consumption possibilities of owner-occupiers. As housing char-
acteristics vary strongly among European countries the inclusion of imputed rents
further allows us to conduct a sound country comparison, which explicitly addresses
and controls for effects stemming from those housing characteristics.
For the estimation we use the capital market approach, since it allows us to use
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one single consistent methodology for all countries and therefore we obtain robust
results, which are not biased by varying estimation methods. We take non-cash
income from imputed rents into account for analysing the income distribution, as
this type of income is not considered in most income statistics, but, nevertheless,
plays a crucial role for the actual economic living conditions.
In countries with a high proportion of owner-occupiers, like Spain and Italy, the
non-cash income from imputed rents plays a more important role, as the estimated
income sums up to 14 - 18 % of the original net income, compared to typical renter-
countries, where this proportion is smaller and amounts up to 7.23 % for Germany
and 3.94 % for France. Overall the distributional effects stemming from the imputed
rents show a clear structure and reduce the inequality of the unconditional distribu-
tion of net income for all countries, whereby the reduction is bigger for countries
with a higher proportion of owner-occupier and smaller for most renter-countries
and barely existent for France and Germany.
The dampening effect of the imputed rents comes along with an increase of
between-groups inequality as renters do not obtain income from imputed rents and
therefore fall behind in the income distribution. By definition, the magnitude of
this effect is bigger in renter-countries. In Germany the between-groups inequality
accounts for 12.9 % of the overall inequality before imputed rents are taken into
account and amounts up to 17.7 % afterwards. In France this proportion raises
from 12.5 % to 16.4 %.
In Spain the share rises from only 3.2 % to 4.7 %, whereas in Italy it goes up
from 11.2 % to 17.0 %. Although the the unconditional distribution of income be-
comes more equal in all countries, renters fall back in the distribution of income. A
recurrent property tax which is implemented in some countries operates as a propor-
tional tax on non-cash income from imputed rents. The exclusion of imputed rents
from taxation distorts the taxation of real income and discriminates renters. The
implicit flat taxation mitigates the home ownership bias of taxation, but contradicts
efficiency considerations and policy preferences in the realms of income taxation.
Hence, a progressive taxation could address the inequality-increasing effects, which
result from segregation of renters and owner-occupiers and guarantee a consistent
taxation as other income forms from capital use like capital gains or rental income
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are also taxed in most countries.
The results from the decomposition show that the housing characteristics in
terms of the proportion of renters and the number of household members deter-
mine the distributional effects strongly. In the renter-countries the effects attributed
to this characteristics reduce the inequality compared to the average of all analysed
countries, whereas in the owner-countries this effect decreases inequality. However,
we find that the remaining distributional effects, stemming from the dispersion of
tenure types along the income distribution and the resulting received non-cash in-
come from imputed rents varies between countries after controlling for the housing
characteristics. This segregation is relatively high in Austria compared to other
renter-countries like France or Germany. Within the owner-countries the degree
of segregation is comparatively high in Italy and lower in Spain and Poland. We
believe that robust results for the distribution of imputed rents and a detailed under-
standing of the complex distributional effects of non-cash income are both valuable
for assembling comparable income statistics like distributional national accounts
and for policy makers to evaluate the effects of tax policies.
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Appendix
A.1 Simulation of net incomes
For these simulations we use national SILC data from 20151, as only these data sets
provide the variables that are required for using EUROMOD. Since the survey for
the HFCS 2014 was mainly conducted in 2013 we use the policy set (tax law etc.)
from 2013. After conducting the simulations via EUROMOD, the simulated taxes
and contributions are extracted separately for each individual in the national SILC
micro-files. We estimate separate tax rates for labour income and capital income.
Thus, this approach allows us to capture differences in the taxation system appro-
priately. In general, the reference income for taxes and contributions constitutes the
taxable income, composed of labour and capital income. Labour income covers em-
ployees’ income, self-employment income and public pensions and rental income,
while capital income includes income from different financial investments.
Given that the unit of taxation is in general the individual and not the house-
hold we carry out the simulations on the individual level and sum them up to the
household level afterwards. We distinguish between simulated income taxes and
social contributions. We calculate tax and contribution ratios for each individual,
where taxes refer to labour income and capital income respectively2, while social
contributions only refer to labour income. The calculated tax and contribution rates
for percentiles are then adjusted for outliers3. In order to provide tax and contribu-
tion rates that can be applied in the HFCS as well, individuals are sorted by taxable
1In general the data sets from 2014 would be the best choice for all countries, but since the data
is not available for this point in time for almost half of the countries data from 2015 is chosen for
all countries to stay consistent. The only exception is Germany for which 2015 data is not available
and hence data from 2014 is used.
2In countries where no distinction between capital income and labour income taxation is made,
taxes refer to the total taxable income.
3In general, especially the lower part of the taxable income distribution is characterised by larger
fluctuations in the rates due to low taxable incomes. Therefore rates larger than 1.00 and smaller
than -1.00 are not considered.
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income to generate average rates for each percentile4. To address the problems of
smaller fluctuations in the mean ratios across the percentiles, all rates are smoothed
along the taxable income distribution using smoothing splines.
To apply the rates in the HFCS we assign the smoothed simulated mean rates to
the corresponding taxable income percentile in the respective HFCS dataset for each
country. The taxable income comprises of the the components gross cash employee
income (PG0110), gross self employment income (PG0210), gross income from
public pensions (PG0310), gross income from occupational and private pension
plans (PG0410), gross income from unemployment benefits (PG0510) and gross
rental income from real estate property (HG0310) which together form the labour
income and gross income from financial investment (HG0410) and gross income
from private business other than self employment (HG0510) which form the capital
income.
Considering capital and labour income again separately, allows to now calculate
absolute values for taxes and contributions. Most components of the capital income
are only available at the household level and since we do not have any information
about the intra-household distribution we assign them equally among all household
members5. Finally we calculate the net income from labour and capital income at
the individual level and summarize it up on the household level. Afterwards we add
the same social transfers, as for the gross household income and hence we obtain
the net disposable household income for every country.
The tax and contribution rates on the individual level are displayed in Figure
A.1. The labour tax ratios contribute to the progressive trajectory of the total con-
tributions ratio in the four displayed countries. The capital gains tax are approxi-
4Corrections are made again for further outliers, that prevail again at the lower tail of the taxable
income distribution. The highest value with a zero mean tax and contribution rate – below the 20th
percentile – is identified and in a next step all percentiles’ rates up to this threshold are also set to
zero.
5Due to lack of additional information variables which are only available on the household level
(HG0310, HG0410 and HG0510) are assigned equally to all household members. As our final unit
of observation is the household level this decision does not affect the calculated capital taxes if a flat
tax is applied. However, if the income component is added to the labour income, which is true for
income from rental income, and the taxation is progressive or in the case of Germany where a tax
allowance per individual is granted on capital gains, the intra-household distribution effect the final
amount of calculated taxes.
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Figure A.1: Estimated tax ratios on individual level
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Source: SILC 2014, All rates are simulated according to the country-specific policy regimes using
EUROMOD, Percentiles are on individual level including young people and other person with no
taxable income. ’All contributions’ refers to the total contributions for labour income, i.e. the sum
from taxes and social contributions for the gross labour income.
mately linear, but vary slightly as different asset classes are taxed at different rates
in France and Italy. In Germany a tax allowance of 800 e per individual has the
effect that only individuals with high taxable income pay capital taxes.
A.2 Decomposition
A.2.1 Theil index
For the Teil index decomposition all households are divided into m subgroups ac-
cording to their tenure types. Then we define
sk as the income share of group k,
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N as total population,
Nk as population of group k,
Tk as Theil index for group k,
µ as the average income of the total population,
x¯k as the average income of group k.
The Theil’s T index can then be written as
TT = m∑
k=1 skTk + m∑k=1 sk ln x¯kµ for sk = NkN x¯kµ
with the first term representing the within-group inequality and the second term
representing the between-group inequality.
A.2.2 Reweighting
Figure A.2 shows the distribution of the estimated propensity scores for the ob-
served countries. After running the logit regressions as set out in Equation (3) and
(4) we obtain the probability for each household to be a household in the respective
country given its housing characteristics. We can see that bigger countries like Ger-
many show higher probabilities, as their households make up a bigger part of all
households, whereas the probabilities for the remaining countries tend to be lower.
As can be seen the common support of the observed countries and the counterfac-
tual pool of all countries is given. This also holds true for the remaining countries
in Figure B.1 which can be found in the Appendix. This indicates that all possible
household types in terms of the feasible combinations (Fessler et al., 2014) of the
categorical housing characteristics are represented in every single country.
Analogous to Figure 8 we present the inequality-reducing effect of the imputed
rents after reweighting, which is ∆T as a percentage of the reweighted Gini index
(IMrew). The reweighting brings the proportions of the categorical housing groups
close to the average of all countries of the decomposition. Since we rebalanced a
categorical variable, consisting of 6 groups, from 1 to 6+ household members, the
overall variation in the average household size is located between 2.25 and 2.45
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Figure A.2: Kernel density estimates of propensity scores
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The grey area shows the estimated kernel density which represents the probability of the households
in the respective country to be a household in the respective country. The blue area (ALL) shows
the the kernel density which represents the probability of all households to be a household in the
respective country.
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Figure A.3: Country groups reweighted - Household size, HFCS II
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A.3 Robusteness Checks
Although the exogenous interest rate of 3 % is based on an average reasonably
risk-free investment product like a 10-year government bond, the choice remains
arbitrary to some extent, but at the same time it crucially determines the effects
of the estimated imputed rents. Therefore, we test the robustness of the analysis in
this Section, by comparing it to the aggregates from national accounts. Furthermore
we test the robustness of the distributional effects in a scenario where we apply an
exogenous interest rate of 2 % and 5 %. However, the bias from the assumption
of an homogeneous interest rate for all households in all countries is not addressed
by this exercise. Linking the financing costs as well as the return on the property
to country-specific circumstances could elaborate the capital market approach for
future research.
A.3.1 Aggregates
In the SILC dataset the imputed rents are calculated by different methods in each
country (To¨rma¨lehto and Sauli (2013)). For Italy, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Malta,
Finland, Cyprus there are no net imputed rents and for Germany there are no gross
imputed rents in the data set. For Austria, Belgium, Spain, Greece, Hungary, Ire-
land, Luxembourg, Latvia, Poland and Portugal the SILC provides the same values
for net and gross imputed rents which should not be the case as interest payments,
taxes and maintenance costs should be considered.
To check for robustness we compare the survey aggregates to the national ac-
counts aggregates. The net imputed rents in Figure A.4 and Table A.1 correspond
to the concept which we used throughout the whole analysis. To construct the
respective SNA aggregates the maintenance aggregate (CP043) (proportional to
the percentage of the non-renters in the country) and the paid interest (D41) from
the household sector (S14) were deducted from the gross imputed rent aggregate
(CP042). The gross imputed rent for the HFCS corresponds to the 3 % return of
the HMR without taking interest payments or maintenance costs into account. The
SILC aggregates correspond to imputed rents for owner-occupier only.
For Spain and Italy all aggregates are on a similar level. For Germany the aggre-
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Figure A.4: HFCS, SILC and national accounts aggregates
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Source: HFCS 2014, SILC 2014, Eurostat
In the SILC dataset gross imputed rents are missing for Germany and net imputed rents for Italy.
gates of the HFCS aggregate (4.71 % of GNP) and SNA (4.91 % of GNP) almost
coincide, whereas SILC data is missing. In France both the HFCS (5.39 %) and
the SILC (5.82 %) underestimate the SNA aggregate (8.19 %). For the net imputed
rents the SILC (Italy is missing) tends to overestimate the SNA aggregates, whereas
our approach tends to underestimate the aggregates from NA. Especially in France
the deviation of the HFCS ( NA: 5.13 %; HFCS: 2.36 %; SILC: 5.15) is very high.
The bias could arise from a higher return on property in France and other countries
which is linked to the nexus of property taxes, rents and the degree of comparability
between renting and housing markets.
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Table A.1: Comparison of national accounts and survey aggregates for all
countries
Gross imputed rent Net imputed rent
HFCS SILC* HFCS SILC**
Survey Aggregate 610,451 471,146 436,856 439,005
Responding SNA Aggregate 697,822 559,898 600,464 407,579
Survey Aggregate in % of GNP 5.98 6.36 4.29 5.75
Responding SNA Aggregate in % of GNP 6.83 7.56 5.89 5.34
Standard Deviation 13,191 11,582 15,429 11,119
Weighted Relative Standard Deviation in % 20.96 19.43 23.60 15.12
Source: HFCS 2014, SILC 2014, Eurostat
Since for Ireland the national accounts data is missing it is excluded from the comparison.
* SILC data is missing for Germany and therefore excluded.
** For IT, NL, SK, MT, FI and CY the SILC provides no data for net imputed rent.
The aggregates of the imputed rents we estimated (see Table A.1) amount to
5.98 % , the SILC aggregates to 6.36 % of the respective GNP. Both respond to
different SNA aggregates as for the SILC countries are missing. The net imputed
rents for the HFCS account for 4.29 %, and the aggregate from SILC to 5.75 % of
GNP. The standard deviation for the HFCS estimates are slightly higher with 20.96
% (gross) and 23.60 % (net) compared to 19.43 % (gross) and 15.12 % (net) for the
SILC. The HFCS tends to underestimate the SNA aggregates for both gross and net
imputed rents whereas the SILC underestimates the gross rents and overestimates
the net rents which is linked to the fact that for most countries in the SILC net and
gross rents are the same. Especially for the implementation of imputed rents in
distributional national accounts
A.3.2 Distributional effects
In this Subsection we test the variation of the distributional effects for an exogenous
interest rate of 2 % and 5 %. In Figure A.2 the distributional effects of the 2 %
scenario are displayed. They are quite similar to the base scenario with owner-
countries having bigger reductions in inequality and renter-countries smaller ones.
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Table A.2: Counterfactual inequality measures - 2 % scenario
Observed net income (yi) + Non-cash income (ynci ) = Total net income (yti)
Gini P90/P50 P90/P10 Gini P90/P50 P90/P10 Gini P90/P50 P90/P10
AT 0.31 1.98 4.12 0.52 1.56 Inf 0.31 1.94 4.08
BE 0.34 2.08 4.38 0.30 1.09 Inf 0.33 2.01 4.24
CY 0.40 2.41 7.87 0.20 1.43 2.21 0.38 2.35 6.20
DE 0.41 2.37 6.78 0.59 Inf Inf 0.41 2.39 6.77
EE 0.49 3.18 9.54 0.26 1.64 Inf 0.47 3.06 8.34
ES 0.41 2.28 6.29 0.23 1.57 Inf 0.39 2.24 5.44
FI 0.35 2.15 5.20 0.39 1.47 Inf 0.34 2.13 5.10
FR 0.34 2.04 4.52 0.47 1.69 Inf 0.34 2.03 4.48
GR 0.34 2.12 5.07 0.29 1.35 Inf 0.33 2.07 4.65
HU 0.40 2.40 5.73 0.21 1.48 1.83 0.38 2.31 5.12
IE 0.38 2.31 6.10 0.34 1.31 Inf 0.37 2.28 5.60
IT 0.37 2.38 5.86 0.32 1.53 Inf 0.36 2.30 5.34
LU 0.37 2.21 5.65 0.36 1.52 Inf 0.36 2.15 5.44
LV 0.51 3.33 8.85 0.36 2.05 Inf 0.50 3.28 8.44
MT 0.39 2.26 6.23 0.22 1.19 Inf 0.36 2.12 5.16
NL 0.32 1.96 4.73 0.43 1.12 Inf 0.31 1.94 4.54
PL 0.39 2.32 6.64 0.19 1.21 1.62 0.39 2.31 6.44
PT 0.38 2.34 5.99 0.27 1.34 Inf 0.37 2.28 5.50
SI 0.40 2.36 7.15 0.21 1.27 Inf 0.38 2.24 6.14
SK 0.38 2.08 6.13 0.20 1.28 Inf 0.36 2.04 5.63
Source: HFCS 2014, net income from EUROMOD simulations
Quantitatively the magnitude of the effects is consistently lower for all countries.
The outcomes for an exogenous interest rate of 5 % are shown in Table A.3.
For most renter-countries a reduction of the Gini index and the percentile ratios
can be seen. In France and Austria the Gini index does not change, as in the 3
% basic scenario. However, the P90/P10 ratio increases for the renter-countries
Germany, France, Austria and Belgium. This indicates that the inequality decrease
at the upper part of the distribution is surpassed by the increase at the lower part of
the distribution which is driven by the enlarged importance of the between-group
inequality, as can be seen in Figure A.5. This matches and confirms our hitherto
results, where we found a strong segregation in terms of the tenure types and their
received non-cash income from imputed rents.
For the renter-countries the inequality-reducing effect of the imputed rents for-
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Table A.3: Counterfactual inequality measures - 5 % scenario
Observed net income (yi) + Non-cash income (ynci ) = Total net income (yti)
Gini P90/P50 P90/P10 Gini P90/P50 P90/P10 Gini P90/P50 P90/P10
AT 0.31 1.98 4.12 0.52 1.56 Inf 0.31 1.94 4.29
BE 0.34 2.08 4.38 0.31 1.17 Inf 0.32 1.92 4.49
CY 0.40 2.41 7.87 0.20 1.44 2.22 0.35 2.22 4.90
DE 0.41 2.37 6.78 0.59 Inf Inf 0.40 2.37 6.92
EE 0.49 3.18 9.54 0.26 1.65 Inf 0.44 2.89 7.00
ES 0.41 2.28 6.29 0.23 1.59 Inf 0.36 2.16 4.57
FI 0.35 2.15 5.20 0.39 1.47 Inf 0.34 2.11 5.07
FR 0.34 2.04 4.52 0.47 1.58 Inf 0.34 2.04 4.56
GR 0.34 2.12 5.07 0.29 1.34 Inf 0.31 2.00 4.19
HU 0.40 2.40 5.73 0.21 1.49 1.83 0.36 2.23 4.55
IE 0.38 2.31 6.10 0.34 1.30 Inf 0.36 2.22 5.11
IT 0.37 2.38 5.86 0.32 1.53 Inf 0.34 2.19 4.85
LU 0.37 2.21 5.65 0.36 1.54 Inf 0.35 2.09 5.65
LV 0.51 3.33 8.85 0.36 2.04 Inf 0.49 3.21 8.05
MT 0.39 2.26 6.23 0.22 1.19 Inf 0.32 1.98 4.53
NL 0.32 1.96 4.73 0.43 1.11 Inf 0.31 1.91 4.51
PL 0.39 2.32 6.64 0.18 1.17 1.55 0.35 2.11 5.00
PT 0.38 2.34 5.99 0.27 1.35 Inf 0.35 2.18 4.93
SI 0.40 2.36 7.15 0.21 1.27 Inf 0.34 2.11 5.42
SK 0.38 2.08 6.13 0.20 1.28 Inf 0.34 1.97 4.92
Source: HFCS 2014, net income from EUROMOD simulations
tifies, as for Spain (-0.05), Italy (-0.03) and Poland (-0.04) the Gini index reduction
magnifies by 0.01, 0.01 and 0.02, compared to the basic scenario.
The strong segregation in Austria also becomes apparent when we look at Fig-
ure A.5, where the increase of the between-groups inequality is graphically shown
for the 5 % scenario. Overall, the proportion of the between-groups inequality in-
creases for all countries, but for Austria it almost triples from 12.7 % to 30.7 %
and thereby surpasses all other countries with a higher initial level of between-
groups inequality. The inflated assessment of the imputed rents tends to magnify
the inequality-increasing effects of the imputed rents for countries with a higher
proportion of renters. Nevertheless, from a comparison with Germany, where the
proportion of renters is the highest, we can see that this effect is also crucially
dependent on the degree of segregation, which is seemingly higher in Austria, as
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Figure A.5: Theil-index - Inequality between tenure groups - 5 % scenario
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Source: HFCS 2014, The beginning of the arrow represents the level of between-groups inequal-
ity for the initially observed net disposable income, whereas the arrow head indicates the level of
between-groups inequality for the total net disposable income (after adding the non-cash income
from imputed rents). The linear correlation for the initially observed net disposable income is
represented by the continuous line. The linear correlation for the total net disposable income is
represented by the dotted line
already shown in Table 6. Furthermore, the comparison of Spain and Italy confirms
this interpretation, since in Italy the between-groups inequality increases signifi-
cantly stronger (11.2 % to 21.6 %) than in Spain (3.2 % to 6.2 %), which again
matches the results from Table 6, showing a greater importance of the treatment
decomposition effect in Italy, compared to Spain.
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A.4 Housing Cost Data
Table A.4: Housing Costs
AT BE CY EE FI FR DE GR HU IE IT LV LU MT NL PL PT SK SI ES
Implicity Property Tax (%) 0.03 0.66 0.16 0.00 0.22 1.25 0.13 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.27 0.95 0.25 0.13 0.13 0.23
Maintenance Costs per sqm (e) 2.84 0.64 0.43 0.42 0.45 4.68 1.54 0.86 0.33 2.04 2.18 0.73 7.13 2.04 2.97 6.41 0.29 2.25 0.67 1.86
Source: Taxation: Housing Taxation Database, European Commission
Maintenance Costs: Eurostat, Own Calculations
The implicit recurrent property tax is dervied from the housing taxation data base
(Barrios et al., 2019). It is based on the data from the SNA, but also on informations
from national experts and can therefore differ from the SNA aggregate in Figure 1.
The maintenance/upkeep costs are derived from the national accounts data from the
OECD. The reference year is 2013. For the countries of the HFCS where sqm data
was not available (MT) the upkeeping costs were calculated by the average costs in
terms of the HMR property value (Vi).
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Figure B.1: Kernel density estimates of propensity scores
0
100
200
300
0.02 0.03 0.04
P(C=c|X)
D
en
si
ty
AT ALL
Austria − Propensity scores
0
50
100
150
200
0.025 0.050 0.075
P(C=c|X)
D
en
si
ty
BE ALL
Belgium − Propensity scores
0
500
1000
0.0000 0.0025 0.0050 0.0075 0.0100 0.0125
P(C=c|X)
D
en
si
ty
CY ALL
Cyprus − Propensity scores
0
5
10
15
20
25
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
P(C=c|X)
D
en
si
ty
DE ALL
Germany − Propensity scores
0
500
1000
0.002 0.004 0.006 0.008
P(C=c|X)
D
en
si
ty
EE ALL
Estonia − Propensity scores
0
10
20
30
0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20
P(C=c|X)
D
en
si
ty
ES ALL
Spain − Propensity scores
0
50
100
150
0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04
P(C=c|X)
D
en
si
ty
FI ALL
Finland − Propensity scores
0
20
40
60
0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20
P(C=c|X)
D
en
si
ty
FR ALL
France − Propensity scores
Kernel density estimates of propensity scores 2014
54
030
60
90
0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05
P(C=c|X)
D
en
si
ty
GR ALL
Greece − Propensity scores
0
50
100
150
0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05
P(C=c|X)
D
en
si
ty
HU ALL
Hungary − Propensity scores
0
100
200
300
400
0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03
P(C=c|X)
D
en
si
ty
IE ALL
Ireland − Propensity scores
0
5
10
15
20
0.1 0.2 0.3
P(C=c|X)
D
en
si
ty
IT ALL
Italy − Propensity scores
0
2000
4000
6000
0.0010 0.0015 0.0020 0.0025
P(C=c|X)
D
en
si
ty
LU ALL
Luxemburg − Propensity scores
0
200
400
600
0.0025 0.0050 0.0075 0.0100 0.0125
P(C=c|X)
D
en
si
ty
LV ALL
Latvia − Propensity scores
0
1000
2000
0.0005 0.0010 0.0015 0.0020
P(C=c|X)
D
en
si
ty
MT ALL
Malta − Propensity scores
0
10
20
30
40
50
0.00 0.05 0.10
P(C=c|X)
D
en
si
ty
NL ALL
Netherlands − Propensity scores
Kernel density estimates of propensity scores 2014
55
010
20
30
40
0.0 0.2 0.4
P(C=c|X)
D
en
si
ty
PL ALL
Poland − Propensity scores
0
50
100
0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05
P(C=c|X)
D
en
si
ty
PT ALL
Portugal − Propensity scores
0
100
200
300
0.005 0.010 0.015 0.020
P(C=c|X)
D
en
si
ty
SI ALL
Slovenia − Propensity scores
0
50
100
150
0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04
P(C=c|X)
D
en
si
ty
SK ALL
Slovakia − Propensity scores
Kernel density estimates of propensity scores 2014
Source: HFCS 2014, Propensity scores from logit reweighting regressions
56
Figure B.2: Tenure status
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Source: 2014, Tenure status is plotted along the full unconditional gross income distribution
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Figure B.3: Estimated tax ratios on individual level
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0 25 50 75 100
Percentiles (Taxable Income)
R
at
es
All contr. Taxes Social contr. Capital gains tax
AT − Tax & contribution rates
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0 25 50 75 100
Percentiles (Taxable Income)
R
at
es
All contr. Taxes Social contr. Capital gains tax
BE − Tax & contribution rates
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0 25 50 75 100
Percentiles (Taxable Income)
R
at
es
All contr. Taxes Social contr. Capital gains tax
CY − Tax & contribution rates
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0 25 50 75 100
Percentiles (Taxable Income)
R
at
es
All contr. Taxes Social contr. Capital gains tax
Germany − Tax & contribution rates
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0 25 50 75 100
Percentiles (Taxable Income)
R
at
es
All contr. Taxes Social contr. Capital gains tax
EE − Tax & contribution rates
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0 25 50 75 100
Percentiles (Taxable Income)
R
at
es
All contr. Taxes Social contr. Capital gains tax
Spain − Tax & contribution rates
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0 25 50 75 100
Percentiles (Taxable Income)
R
at
es
All contr. Taxes Social contr. Capital gains tax
FI − Tax & contribution rates
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0 25 50 75 100
Percentiles (Taxable Income)
R
at
es
All contr. Taxes Social contr. Capital gains tax
France − Tax & contribution rates
Tax Rates 2014
60
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0 25 50 75 100
Percentiles (Taxable Income)
R
at
es
All contr. Taxes Social contr. Capital gains tax
EL − Tax & contribution rates
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0 25 50 75 100
Percentiles (Taxable Income)
R
at
es
All contr. Taxes Social contr. Capital gains tax
HU − Tax & contribution rates
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0 25 50 75 100
Percentiles (Taxable Income)
R
at
es
All contr. Taxes Social contr. Capital gains tax
IE − Tax & contribution rates
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0 25 50 75 100
Percentiles (Taxable Income)
R
at
es
All contr. Taxes Social contr. Capital gains tax
Italy − Tax & contribution rates
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0 25 50 75 100
Percentiles (Taxable Income)
R
at
es
All contr. Taxes Social contr. Capital gains tax
LU − Tax & contribution rates
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0 25 50 75 100
Percentiles (Taxable Income)
R
at
es
All contr. Taxes Social contr. Capital gains tax
LV − Tax & contribution rates
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0 25 50 75 100
Percentiles (Taxable Income)
R
at
es
All contr. Taxes Social contr. Capital gains tax
MT − Tax & contribution rates
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0 25 50 75 100
Percentiles (Taxable Income)
R
at
es
All contr. Taxes Social contr. Capital gains tax
NL − Tax & contribution rates
Tax Rates 2014
61
0.0
0.1
0.2
0 25 50 75 100
Percentiles (Taxable Income)
R
at
es
All contr. Taxes Social contr. Capital gains tax
PL − Tax & contribution rates
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0 25 50 75 100
Percentiles (Taxable Income)
R
at
es
All contr. Taxes Social contr. Capital gains tax
PT − Tax & contribution rates
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0 25 50 75 100
Percentiles (Taxable Income)
R
at
es
All contr. Taxes Social contr. Capital gains tax
SI − Tax & contribution rates
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0 25 50 75 100
Percentiles (Taxable Income)
R
at
es
All contr. Taxes Social contr. Capital gains tax
SK − Tax & contribution rates
Tax Rates 2014
Source: SILC 2014, All rates are simulated according to the country-specific policy regimes using
EUROMOD, Percentiles are on individual level including children and other person with no taxable
income. ’All contributions’ refers to the total contributions for labour income, i.e. the sum from
taxes and social contributions for the gross labour income.
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Figure B.4: Dispersion of imputed rents along the income distribution
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Figure B.5: Observed private market rents and imputed rents
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Source: HFCS 2014, Rents are plotted for owner-occupiers (Imputed rent) and renters (Market rent)
along the respective distribution of rents
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Figure B.6: Observed private market rents and imputed rents
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Source: HFCS 2014, Rents are plotted for owner-occupiers (Imputed rent) and renters (Market rent)
along the gross income distribution and smoothed (Local Linear Regressions)
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Table B.1: AT - Gross income, HFCS 2014
Observed income (yi) + Non-cash income (ynci ) = Total Income (yti) Household members
mean median mean median mean median change in % above 16y in employment
Free User 30.59 25.25 6.53 5.77 37.12 31.62 21.35 1.57 0.44
Mortgaged Owner 60.49 54.41 5.71 4.66 66.20 58.51 9.44 2.28 1.63
Outright Owner 49.11 40.17 7.85 6.06 56.96 47.03 15.98 2.05 0.87
Renter 35.34 29.92 0 0 35.34 29.92 0 1.54 0.89
Total 43.33 35.69 3.87 1.81 47.20 39.42 8.93 1.82 0.96
Table B.2: AT - Net income, HFCS 2014
Observed income (yi) + Non-cash income (ynci ) = Total Income (yti) Household members
mean median mean median mean median change in % above 16y in employment
Free User 23.24 20.20 6.53 5.77 29.77 26.26 28.10 1.57 0.44
Mortgaged Owner 42.28 39.34 5.71 4.66 48 44.88 13.51 2.28 1.63
Outright Owner 35.09 30.45 7.85 6.06 42.94 37.18 22.37 2.05 0.87
Renter 26.07 22.49 0 0 26.07 22.49 0 1.54 0.89
Total 31.28 26.98 3.87 1.81 35.15 30.77 12.37 1.82 0.96
Table B.3: BE - Gross income, HFCS 2014
Observed income (yi) + Non-cash income (ynci ) = Total Income (yti) Household members
mean median mean median mean median change in % above 16y in employment
Free User 51.09 38.73 6.31 6.29 57.40 45.17 12.35 1.72 0.75
Mortgaged Owner 72.38 66.01 3.56 2.91 75.94 69.10 4.92 2.26 1.70
Outright Owner 48.18 38.17 6.07 5.72 54.25 44.56 12.60 1.89 0.55
Renter 33.01 25.14 0 0 33.01 25.14 0 1.53 0.65
Total 51.96 41.20 3.66 3.37 55.61 45.76 7.04 1.91 0.95
Table B.4: BE - Net income, HFCS 2014
Observed income (yi) + Non-cash income (ynci ) = Total Income (yti) Household members
mean median mean median mean median change in % above 16y in employment
Free User 39.03 26.92 6.31 6.29 45.35 33.18 16.17 1.72 0.75
Mortgaged Owner 48.78 46.52 3.56 2.91 52.33 49.72 7.30 2.26 1.70
Outright Owner 34.74 29.06 6.07 5.72 40.81 34.87 17.47 1.89 0.55
Renter 24.98 20.22 0 0 24.98 20.22 0 1.53 0.65
Total 36.76 31.02 3.66 3.37 40.41 35.07 9.96 1.91 0.95
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Table B.5: CY - Gross income, HFCS 2014
Observed income (yi) + Non-cash income (ynci ) = Total Income (yti) Household members
mean median mean median mean median change in % above 16y in employment
Free User 19.33 17.17 4.52 3.72 23.85 20.98 23.38 1.90 0.48
Mortgaged Owner 35.71 30.75 4.08 2.94 39.79 34.93 11.43 2.38 1.45
Outright Owner 32.60 23.47 5.41 4.44 38.02 28.97 16.60 2.36 0.99
Renter 22.94 19.94 0 0 22.94 19.94 0 1.70 1.23
Total 30.46 22.69 4.32 3.52 34.78 26.41 14.18 2.22 1.08
Table B.6: CY - Net income, HFCS 2014
Observed income (yi) + Non-cash income (ynci ) = Total Income (yti) Household members
mean median mean median mean median change in % above 16y in employment
Free User 17.83 16.22 4.52 3.72 22.35 20.11 25.35 1.90 0.48
Mortgaged Owner 31.30 27.92 4.08 2.94 35.38 32.03 13.04 2.38 1.45
Outright Owner 28.58 21.85 5.41 4.44 34 27.25 18.93 2.36 0.99
Renter 20.82 18.77 0 0 20.82 18.77 0 1.70 1.23
Total 26.93 21.19 4.32 3.52 31.25 24.88 16.04 2.22 1.08
Table B.7: DE - Gross income, HFCS 2014
Observed income (yi) + Non-cash income (ynci ) = Total Income (yti) Household members
mean median mean median mean median change in % above 16y in employment
Free User 29.79 22.06 4.90 4.54 34.69 29.03 16.45 1.49 0.60
Mortgaged Owner 76.98 60.74 3.87 2.28 80.85 63.63 5.03 2.10 1.65
Outright Owner 56.60 41 6.12 4.15 62.72 44.84 10.81 1.82 0.82
Renter 36.34 28.13 0 0 36.34 28.13 0 1.54 0.90
Total 48.40 35.46 2.56 0 50.96 37.72 5.29 1.71 0.99
Table B.8: DE - Net income, HFCS 2014
Observed income (yi) + Non-cash income (ynci ) = Total Income (yti) Household members
mean median mean median mean median change in % above 16y in employment
Free User 23.04 19.29 4.90 4.54 27.94 24.70 21.27 1.49 0.60
Mortgaged Owner 54.31 43.93 3.87 2.28 58.18 47.01 7.13 2.10 1.65
Outright Owner 40.74 30.91 6.12 4.15 46.86 35.73 15.02 1.82 0.82
Renter 27.46 22.49 0 0 27.46 22.49 0 1.54 0.90
Total 35.39 27.10 2.56 0 37.96 29.54 7.23 1.71 0.99
Table B.9: EE - Gross income, HFCS 2014
Observed income (yi) + Non-cash income (ynci ) = Total Income (yti) Household members
mean median mean median mean median change in % above 16y in employment
Free User 9.42 5.35 1.92 1.47 11.35 7.64 20.38 1.42 0.59
Mortgaged Owner 31.61 25.93 1.93 0.96 33.53 28.01 6.11 2.17 1.61
Outright Owner 14.79 9.46 1.72 1.14 16.50 11.16 11.63 1.96 0.87
Renter 13.38 9.49 0 0 13.38 9.49 0 1.55 0.88
Total 17.09 11.05 1.59 1 18.69 12.45 9.30 1.88 0.97
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Table B.10: EE - Net income, HFCS 2014
Observed income (yi) + Non-cash income (ynci ) = Total Income (yti) Household members
mean median mean median mean median change in % above 16y in employment
Free User 8.03 4.86 1.92 1.47 9.95 7.06 23.91 1.42 0.59
Mortgaged Owner 25.92 21.15 1.93 0.96 27.85 23.44 7.45 2.17 1.61
Outright Owner 12.52 8.28 1.72 1.14 14.24 9.99 13.74 1.96 0.87
Renter 11.18 7.92 0 0 11.18 7.92 0 1.55 0.88
Total 14.31 9.44 1.59 1 15.90 10.95 11.11 1.88 0.97
Table B.11: ES - Gross income, HFCS 2014
Observed income (yi) + Non-cash income (ynci ) = Total Income (yti) Household members
mean median mean median mean median change in % above 16y in employment
Free User 21.08 14.63 5.05 4.23 26.13 20.48 23.96 1.96 0.82
Mortgaged Owner 37.47 29.67 2.58 2 40.05 31.90 6.89 2.26 1.43
Outright Owner 31.64 22.55 4.87 3.96 36.51 26.59 15.39 2.22 0.79
Renter 24.54 17.53 0 0 24.54 17.53 0 2.11 0.99
Total 31.86 24 3.71 3.16 35.57 26.98 11.64 2.20 0.99
Table B.12: ES - Net income, HFCS 2014
Observed income (yi) + Non-cash income (ynci ) = Total Income (yti) Household members
mean median mean median mean median change in % above 16y in employment
Free User 18.03 13.06 5.05 4.23 23.07 18.36 28.01 1.96 0.82
Mortgaged Owner 30.80 25.69 2.58 2 33.38 27.77 8.38 2.26 1.43
Outright Owner 26 19.81 4.87 3.96 30.87 23.82 18.73 2.22 0.79
Renter 20.51 15.44 0 0 20.51 15.44 0 2.11 0.99
Total 26.26 20.94 3.71 3.16 29.97 23.89 14.13 2.20 0.99
Table B.13: FI - Gross income, HFCS 2014
Observed income (yi) + Non-cash income (ynci ) = Total Income (yti) Household members
mean median mean median mean median change in % above 16y in employment
Free User 26.52 20.92 3.61 3.04 30.13 23.70 13.61 1.43 0.42
Mortgaged Owner 71.44 63.37 3.09 2.31 74.54 66.14 4.33 1.95 1.37
Outright Owner 48.28 37.95 4.56 3.83 52.84 41.88 9.44 1.70 0.56
Renter 30.39 23.53 0 0 30.39 23.53 0 1.40 0.60
Total 50.06 40.08 2.64 1.81 52.71 42.45 5.27 1.69 0.84
Table B.14: FI - Net income, HFCS 2014
Observed income (yi) + Non-cash income (ynci ) = Total Income (yti) Household members
mean median mean median mean median change in % above 16y in employment
Free User 21.57 17.51 3.61 3.04 25.18 21.73 16.74 1.43 0.42
Mortgaged Owner 51.26 47.66 3.09 2.31 54.35 50.58 6.03 1.95 1.37
Outright Owner 36.12 30.19 4.56 3.83 40.69 34.47 12.62 1.70 0.56
Renter 24.56 20.51 0 0 24.56 20.51 0 1.40 0.60
Total 37.32 31.43 2.64 1.81 39.97 33.99 7.07 1.69 0.84
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Table B.15: FR - Gross income, HFCS 2014
Observed income (yi) + Non-cash income (ynci ) = Total Income (yti) Household members
mean median mean median mean median change in % above 16y in employment
Free User 28.84 22.93 2.91 2.92 31.76 26.39 10.09 1.62 0.80
Mortgaged Owner 50.36 45.32 1.13 0.16 51.49 46.10 2.24 2.08 1.58
Outright Owner 42.76 34.61 2.98 2.49 45.74 37.46 6.97 1.83 0.60
Renter 26.48 22.33 0 0 26.48 22.33 0 1.60 0.78
Total 37.55 30.46 1.48 0.48 39.03 31.74 3.94 1.78 0.86
Table B.16: FR - Net income, HFCS 2014
Observed income (yi) + Non-cash income (ynci ) = Total Income (yti) Household members
mean median mean median mean median change in % above 16y in employment
Free User 22.43 18.60 2.91 2.92 25.34 22.01 12.97 1.62 0.80
Mortgaged Owner 37.79 35.08 1.13 0.16 38.92 36.17 2.99 2.08 1.58
Outright Owner 32.40 27.29 2.98 2.49 35.38 30.13 9.20 1.83 0.60
Renter 21.24 18.35 0 0 21.24 18.35 0 1.60 0.78
Total 28.85 24.53 1.48 0.48 30.33 25.80 5.13 1.78 0.86
Table B.17: GR - Gross income, HFCS 2014
Observed income (yi) + Non-cash income (ynci ) = Total Income (yti) Household members
mean median mean median mean median change in % above 16y in employment
Free User 15.35 12.97 2.02 1.98 17.37 15.18 13.16 1.84 0.74
Mortgaged Owner 25.20 21.56 1.50 1.14 26.70 22.60 5.95 2.55 1.10
Outright Owner 21.87 18.05 2.19 1.89 24.05 20 10.01 2.19 0.67
Renter 19.02 16.45 0 0 19.02 16.45 0 1.85 0.98
Total 21.21 17.65 1.63 1.38 22.84 19.22 7.69 2.14 0.79
Table B.18: GR - Net income, HFCS 2014
Observed income (yi) + Non-cash income (ynci ) = Total Income (yti) Household members
mean median mean median mean median change in % above 16y in employment
Free User 12.33 10.83 2.02 1.98 14.35 12.96 16.38 1.84 0.74
Mortgaged Owner 19.51 16.69 1.50 1.14 21.01 18.20 7.69 2.55 1.10
Outright Owner 17.22 14.32 2.19 1.89 19.40 16.55 12.72 2.19 0.67
Renter 14.89 13.11 0 0 14.89 13.11 0 1.85 0.98
Total 16.66 14.08 1.63 1.38 18.29 15.62 9.78 2.14 0.79
Table B.19: HU - Gross income, HFCS 2014
Observed income (yi) + Non-cash income (ynci ) = Total Income (yti) Household members
mean median mean median mean median change in % above 16y in employment
Free User 7 5.42 0.92 0.88 7.91 6.43 13.14 1.49 0.68
Mortgaged Owner 13.06 10.68 0.69 0.45 13.76 11.29 5.28 2.25 1.48
Outright Owner 10.65 7.52 1.06 0.76 11.71 8.60 9.95 1.98 0.94
Renter 9.72 7.71 0 0 9.72 7.71 0 1.86 1.16
Total 10.78 7.92 0.88 0.65 11.67 8.77 8.16 1.99 1.04
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Table B.20: HU - Net income, HFCS 2014
Observed income (yi) + Non-cash income (ynci ) = Total Income (yti) Household members
mean median mean median mean median change in % above 16y in employment
Free User 5.38 4.45 0.92 0.88 6.30 5.30 17.10 1.49 0.68
Mortgaged Owner 9.59 8.08 0.69 0.45 10.28 8.73 7.19 2.25 1.48
Outright Owner 7.92 5.99 1.06 0.76 8.98 7.04 13.38 1.98 0.94
Renter 7.31 6.07 0 0 7.31 6.07 0 1.86 1.16
Total 8.01 6.26 0.88 0.65 8.90 7.11 10.99 1.99 1.04
Table B.21: IE - Gross income, HFCS 2014
Observed income (yi) + Non-cash income (ynci ) = Total Income (yti) Household members
mean median mean median mean median change in % above 16y in employment
Free User 35.35 28.34 4.59 4.59 39.94 32.93 12.98 1.66 0.84
Mortgaged Owner 76.45 63.89 2.13 1.04 78.58 66.02 2.79 2.32 1.52
Outright Owner 48.60 33.09 5.02 4.25 53.61 38.06 10.33 2.13 0.75
Renter 37.20 29.07 0 0 37.20 29.07 0 1.77 0.89
Total 54.64 39.80 2.62 1.65 57.26 41.87 4.80 2.09 1.05
Table B.22: IE - Net income, HFCS 2014
Observed income (yi) + Non-cash income (ynci ) = Total Income (yti) Household members
mean median mean median mean median change in % above 16y in employment
Free User 29.36 25.12 4.59 4.59 33.95 29.71 15.63 1.66 0.84
Mortgaged Owner 55.83 49.73 2.13 1.04 57.96 51.48 3.82 2.32 1.52
Outright Owner 38.28 28.91 5.02 4.25 43.29 33.50 13.11 2.13 0.75
Renter 30.88 26.25 0 0 30.88 26.25 0 1.77 0.89
Total 42.02 33.62 2.62 1.65 44.64 36.29 6.24 2.09 1.05
Table B.23: IT - Gross income, HFCS 2014
Observed income (yi) + Non-cash income (ynci ) = Total Income (yti) Household members
mean median mean median mean median change in % above 16y in employment
Free User 22.74 18.25 5.13 4.88 27.87 23.31 22.56 1.73 0.77
Mortgaged Owner 48.87 40.38 3.87 2.91 52.74 43.12 7.92 2.29 1.53
Outright Owner 36.94 28.45 6.12 4.85 43.06 34.02 16.57 2.18 0.81
Renter 21.75 18.58 0 0 21.75 18.58 0 1.99 0.88
Total 33.37 25 4.53 3.89 37.90 28.84 13.58 2.10 0.89
Table B.24: IT - Net income, HFCS 2014
Observed income (yi) + Non-cash income (ynci ) = Total Income (yti) Household members
mean median mean median mean median change in % above 16y in employment
Free User 17.61 14.80 5.13 4.88 22.75 19.96 29.13 1.73 0.77
Mortgaged Owner 34.92 30.76 3.87 2.91 38.79 33.86 11.08 2.29 1.53
Outright Owner 27.47 22.25 6.12 4.85 33.59 28.05 22.28 2.18 0.81
Renter 17.19 15.12 0 0 17.19 15.12 0 1.99 0.88
Total 24.97 19.68 4.53 3.89 29.50 23.84 18.14 2.10 0.89
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Table B.25: LU - Gross income, HFCS 2014
Observed income (yi) + Non-cash income (ynci ) = Total Income (yti) Household members
mean median mean median mean median change in % above 16y in employment
Free User 58.55 49.84 14.03 11.29 72.59 58.79 23.96 1.78 0.87
Mortgaged Owner 108.57 85.09 11.11 8.52 119.68 97.57 10.23 2.24 1.55
Outright Owner 94.01 73.02 17.38 14.91 111.39 90.18 18.49 1.96 0.74
Renter 60.16 41.78 0 0 60.16 41.78 0 1.74 1.04
Total 87.20 64.59 10.65 9.47 97.85 75.06 12.21 1.97 1.06
Table B.26: LU - Net income, HFCS 2014
Observed income (yi) + Non-cash income (ynci ) = Total Income (yti) Household members
mean median mean median mean median change in % above 16y in employment
Free User 46.62 39.30 14.03 11.29 60.66 49.93 30.09 1.78 0.87
Mortgaged Owner 79.80 66.34 11.11 8.52 90.91 77.57 13.92 2.24 1.55
Outright Owner 69.37 56.42 17.38 14.91 86.74 73.12 25.05 1.96 0.74
Renter 46.57 35.96 0 0 46.57 35.96 0 1.74 1.04
Total 65.02 53.16 10.65 9.47 75.67 62.57 16.38 1.97 1.06
Table B.27: LV - Gross income, HFCS 2014
Observed income (yi) + Non-cash income (ynci ) = Total Income (yti) Household members
mean median mean median mean median change in % above 16y in employment
Free User 8.77 4.63 0.77 0.60 9.54 5.57 8.78 1.47 0.72
Mortgaged Owner 30.29 18.98 0.68 0.21 30.98 20.44 2.24 2.49 1.79
Outright Owner 12.13 8.12 0.70 0.40 12.83 8.91 5.77 2.04 0.98
Renter 11.62 5.82 0 0 11.62 5.82 0 1.74 0.87
Total 14.24 8.70 0.59 0.32 14.83 9.16 4.14 2.01 1.05
Table B.28: LV - Net income, HFCS 2014
Observed income (yi) + Non-cash income (ynci ) = Total Income (yti) Household members
mean median mean median mean median change in % above 16y in employment
Free User 6.84 3.82 0.77 0.60 7.60 4.80 11.26 1.47 0.72
Mortgaged Owner 24.19 14.93 0.68 0.21 24.87 15.41 2.81 2.49 1.79
Outright Owner 9.65 6.52 0.70 0.40 10.34 7.26 7.25 2.04 0.98
Renter 9.33 4.59 0 0 9.33 4.59 0 1.74 0.87
Total 11.34 6.86 0.59 0.32 11.92 7.61 5.20 2.01 1.05
Table B.29: MT - Gross income, HFCS 2014
Observed income (yi) + Non-cash income (ynci ) = Total Income (yti) Household members
mean median mean median mean median change in % above 16y in employment
Free User 21.86 15.33 5.72 4.70 27.58 22.26 26.17 1.67 0.90
Mortgaged Owner 37.41 32.79 4.06 3.33 41.48 36.28 10.85 2.01 1.63
Outright Owner 29.73 23.41 6.29 5.35 36.02 29.52 21.16 2.37 1.11
Renter 19.41 12.04 0 0 19.41 12.04 0 1.82 0.62
Total 28.97 22.98 4.83 4.44 33.80 27.73 16.67 2.20 1.10
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Table B.30: MT - Net income, HFCS 2014
Observed income (yi) + Non-cash income (ynci ) = Total Income (yti) Household members
mean median mean median mean median change in % above 16y in employment
Free User 18.76 13.79 5.72 4.70 24.48 20.80 30.49 1.67 0.90
Mortgaged Owner 30.27 27.34 4.06 3.33 34.33 30.56 13.41 2.01 1.63
Outright Owner 24.93 20.19 6.29 5.35 31.22 26.34 25.23 2.37 1.11
Renter 16.58 11.07 0 0 16.58 11.07 0 1.82 0.62
Total 24.18 19.88 4.83 4.44 29.01 24.79 19.98 2.20 1.10
Table B.31: NL - Gross income, HFCS 2014
Observed income (yi) + Non-cash income (ynci ) = Total Income (yti) Household members
mean median mean median mean median change in % above 16y in employment
Free User 17.55 16.73 40.15 5.10 57.69 24.92 228.77 1.25 0.67
Mortgaged Owner 62.52 57.14 2.49 1.76 65 59.11 3.98 2.04 1.16
Outright Owner 55.28 50.39 6.22 5.69 61.49 56.87 11.25 1.95 1.08
Renter 36.94 31.24 0 0 36.94 31.24 0 1.48 0.65
Total 50.26 43.82 2.38 0 52.64 45.80 4.74 1.78 0.93
Table B.32: NL - Net income, HFCS 2014
Observed income (yi) + Non-cash income (ynci ) = Total Income (yti) Household members
mean median mean median mean median change in % above 16y in employment
Free User 13.59 13.19 40.15 5.10 53.74 20.79 295.44 1.25 0.67
Mortgaged Owner 40.89 38.38 2.49 1.76 43.38 40.15 6.09 2.04 1.16
Outright Owner 37.28 34 6.22 5.69 43.50 40.54 16.68 1.95 1.08
Renter 26.19 22.76 0 0 26.19 22.76 0 1.48 0.65
Total 33.93 30.26 2.38 0 36.31 32.48 7.01 1.78 0.93
Table B.33: PL - Gross income, HFCS 2014
Observed income (yi) + Non-cash income (ynci ) = Total Income (yti) Household members
mean median mean median mean median change in % above 16y in employment
Free User 11.76 8.82 0.86 0.73 12.62 9.52 7.31 1.99 0.83
Mortgaged Owner 24.68 20.60 0.59 0.12 25.26 21.13 2.39 2.32 1.69
Outright Owner 16.90 13.70 1.05 0.75 17.95 14.78 6.21 2.52 1.22
Renter 13.44 10.04 0 0 13.44 10.04 0 1.77 0.97
Total 16.83 13.43 0.87 0.62 17.70 14.34 5.17 2.36 1.20
Table B.34: PL - Net income, HFCS 2014
Observed income (yi) + Non-cash income (ynci ) = Total Income (yti) Household members
mean median mean median mean median change in % above 16y in employment
Free User 8.99 6.88 0.86 0.73 9.86 7.55 9.57 1.99 0.83
Mortgaged Owner 18.35 15.35 0.59 0.12 18.94 16.02 3.22 2.32 1.69
Outright Owner 12.78 10.49 1.05 0.75 13.83 11.55 8.22 2.52 1.22
Renter 10.21 7.70 0 0 10.21 7.70 0 1.77 0.97
Total 12.71 10.34 0.87 0.62 13.58 11.19 6.85 2.36 1.20
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Table B.35: PT - Gross income, HFCS 2014
Observed income (yi) + Non-cash income (ynci ) = Total Income (yti) Household members
mean median mean median mean median change in % above 16y in employment
Free User 13.10 9.84 2.45 2.33 15.55 12.24 18.70 1.89 0.79
Mortgaged Owner 29.13 23.27 1.38 0.86 30.50 24.25 4.74 2.36 1.56
Outright Owner 20.16 13.42 2.56 2.05 22.72 15.85 12.70 2.19 0.66
Renter 14.45 11.99 0 0 14.45 11.99 0 2.05 0.79
Total 21.55 15.40 1.70 1.32 23.25 16.99 7.89 2.20 0.99
Table B.36: PT - Net income, HFCS 2014
Observed income (yi) + Non-cash income (ynci ) = Total Income (yti) Household members
mean median mean median mean median change in % above 16y in employment
Free User 11.23 9.10 2.45 2.33 13.68 11.55 21.82 1.89 0.79
Mortgaged Owner 22.14 18.91 1.38 0.86 23.51 20.20 6.23 2.36 1.56
Outright Owner 15.92 11.90 2.56 2.05 18.48 14.30 16.08 2.19 0.66
Renter 12.18 10.76 0 0 12.18 10.76 0 2.05 0.79
Total 16.93 13.50 1.70 1.32 18.64 15.16 10.04 2.20 0.99
Table B.37: SI - Gross income, HFCS 2014
Observed income (yi) + Non-cash income (ynci ) = Total Income (yti) Household members
mean median mean median mean median change in % above 16y in employment
Free User 17.12 11.31 2.68 2.58 19.81 14.70 15.65 1.73 0.90
Mortgaged Owner 31.58 24.07 2.37 1.55 33.94 26.32 7.50 2.39 1.48
Outright Owner 20 15.51 2.87 2.38 22.87 18.16 14.35 2.24 0.87
Renter 14.27 10.17 0 0 14.27 10.17 0 1.73 0.81
Total 19.84 14.93 2.46 2.11 22.30 17.33 12.40 2.12 0.92
Table B.38: SI - Net income, HFCS 2014
Observed income (yi) + Non-cash income (ynci ) = Total Income (yti) Household members
mean median mean median mean median change in % above 16y in employment
Free User 12.84 9.27 2.68 2.58 15.53 12.25 20.87 1.73 0.90
Mortgaged Owner 22.25 18.74 2.37 1.55 24.62 20.84 10.65 2.39 1.48
Outright Owner 15.20 12.84 2.87 2.38 18.08 15.38 18.88 2.24 0.87
Renter 11 8.59 0 0 11 8.59 0 1.73 0.81
Total 14.94 12.20 2.46 2.11 17.39 14.61 16.47 2.12 0.92
Table B.39: SK - Gross income, HFCS 2014
Observed income (yi) + Non-cash income (ynci ) = Total Income (yti) Household members
mean median mean median mean median change in % above 16y in employment
Free User 10.93 7.71 1.43 1.42 12.36 9.08 13.08 1.94 1.11
Mortgaged Owner 19.92 17.84 1.03 0.75 20.94 18.87 5.17 2.54 1.81
Outright Owner 15.25 12.59 1.41 1.24 16.67 13.86 9.25 2.39 1.13
Renter 11.85 10.71 0 0 11.85 10.71 0 2.01 1.16
Total 15.42 13.13 1.21 1.08 16.64 14.31 7.85 2.35 1.24
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Table B.40: SK - Net income, HFCS 2014
Observed income (yi) + Non-cash income (ynci ) = Total Income (yti) Household members
mean median mean median mean median change in % above 16y in employment
Free User 9.08 7.08 1.43 1.42 10.52 8.43 15.75 1.94 1.11
Mortgaged Owner 15.66 14.22 1.03 0.75 16.69 15.25 6.58 2.54 1.81
Outright Owner 12.35 10.58 1.41 1.24 13.76 11.85 11.42 2.39 1.13
Renter 9.67 9.07 0 0 9.67 9.07 0 2.01 1.16
Total 12.43 10.83 1.21 1.08 13.64 11.85 9.73 2.35 1.24
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